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The issuance of weak patents is widely viewed as a fundamental problem in the current US 
patent system. Reasons that have been offered for the granting of weak patents by the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) include examiners’ “rational ignorance” of the 
patentability of applications and pro-“customer” rules and institutions that create incentives 
for examiners to grant patents of dubious validity to their “customers”- applicants. In this 
paper, we study whether US examiners’ behavior in prior art search betrays their assessment 
of applications’ patentability. For a sample of US patents for which applications were also 
filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), we construct a measure of the fraction of prior art 
that is missed by US examiners. We find that this measure significantly explains the 
probability of receiving a patent at the EPO. The results are robust to different empirical 
specifications. US examiners’ prior art searches indicate that they are, on average, not 
“rationally ignorant”. On the contrary, they identify and dedicate more search effort to those 
applications that seem more problematic, because they bear the burden of proof of 
non-patentability. Our study offers empirical evidence that a systematic problem of weak 
patents likely exists, and suggests that the problem may be more strongly attributable to the 
pro-applicant rules and policies than to examiners’ ignorance. The current prevalence of weak 
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1. Introduction 
The US patent system has a key role in stimulating technological innovation by 
offering the prospect of economic rewards to inventors, and patenting is a big business in the 
United States. In 2007 approximately 467,243 patent applications were filed with the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and 184,377 new patents were issued, and both 
numbers have been growing steadily.
1  
However, there has been increasing concern about the operation of the US patent 
system in recent years. Critics such as Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner claim that “the system is 
broken and endangering innovation and progress,” and one of the fundamental problems is 
that “the technology world today is awash in patents that should not have been granted in the 
first place.”
2 Patents “ that should not have been granted in the first place” are called weak 
patents, because they are either not novel or obvious, in the light of prior art (including prior 
inventions and knowledge).
3  Another way to think about weak patents is the notion of patent 
weakness (strength), conceptualized as the probability of being invalidated (validated) under a 
perfect re-examination
4  or by an ideal court trial
5 if  challenged. 
What are the costs of weak patents?
6 Since market power enjoyed by a patent holder 
is typically considered to be a social cost that is necessary to stimulate innovation, weak 
patents might cause social costs without commensurate social benefits associated with 
increased innovation. Furthermore, there is generally no reason to expect that private 
incentives to challenge weak patents through litigation line up well with the social incentives.
7 
                                                        
1  USPTO Annual Report (2007), Tables 2 and 6 (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007). 
2  Jaffe and Lerner (2004), page 
3  Some widely cited and absurd patents include a method for swinging on a swing (US Patent No. 
6,368,227); and a “sealed crustless sandwich” (US Patent No. 6,004,597). 
4  By a perfect re-examination, we mean that the re-examination is a perfectly thorough and accurate 
implementation of the relevant statutes. 
5  It is well recognized that, in practice, a court’s decision on patent validity is to a large extent determined 
by which side has more resources and means to invest on the trial, such as hiring better lawyers, etc. By an 
ideal court trial we mean that the court decision is immune from those factors (say, in the case of both sides 
having infinite resource and money), and completely based on the patentability of a patent. 
6  For detailed discussions of costs of weak patents, see Lemley and Shapiro (2005) and Shapiro (2004). To 
give an example, Research In Motion, the company that sells BlackBerry wireless e-mail service, was sued 
by a company named NTP for infringing NTP’s patents and paid a $612 million “ransom” to settle the case, 
even though the USPTO had already indicated that it was likely to conclude soon that the NTP patents 
BlackBerry was accused of infringing were not even valid. 
7  See Farrell and Merges (2004) for a discussion of various incentives to challenge patents. They point out 
that private incentives could be suboptimal due to the problems of free-riding and pass-through of royalties.   3
Proliferation of weak patents in a technology field raises the cost of licensing, litigation, or 
avoiding infringement.
8  Uncertainty about the validity of previously issued patents may deter 
investment in innovation and/or distort its direction. Rent-seeking entrepreneurs may divert 
resources from productive activities into speculative patent acquisition and enforcement 
ventures. The Patent Reform Act, which has been discussed on the Capitol Hill since 2005, 
includes measures addressing the problem of weak patents.
9  
Why are weak patents issued? Statutory requirements for patentability of an invention 
include novelty, non-obviousness and reduction to practice.
10 Upon receiving an application, 
a USPTO examiner is responsible for searching for and obtaining its prior art, and comparing 
the application to the prior art to evaluate its patentability. Two reasons, broadly speaking, 
have been offered for why US examiners issue so many weak patents.
11 The first is 
examiners’ lack of qualifications, experience,
12  time and resources for searching for prior art 
and evaluating each application,
13  all of which are related to the level of funding available to 
the USPTO.
14 It is alleged that, at the USPTO, an inexperienced workforce of examiners 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Choi (2005) discusses the discrepancy in private incentives and social incentives to litigate, because of the 
possibility of cross-licensing and patent pools.   
8  Farrell and Shapiro (2008) study how the structure and level of royalties depends on a patent’s strength. 
They show that when downstream licensees do not compete against each other or the patent holder, license 
fees approximate the license fee for an ironclad patent times the patent strength. When downstream users 
compete, they will accept surprisingly large per-unit royalties.   
9  The House passed a version of the patent reform bill (HR 1908) in July, 2007. The bill suffered a serious. 
setback in May 2008 when its Senate version (S 1145) was stalled. See more of the history of this Patent 
Reform Act, visit http://www.fr.com/news/articledetail.cfm?articleid=490. 
10  The US Patent Act of 1952 (35 U.S.C.) allows the granting of patents to “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement” (Section 101), and 
precludes patent granting for subject matter that “was known or used by others” (Section 102), or “would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” (Section 
103) These are called the utility, the novelty and the non-obviousness requirements, respectively.   
11  See National Academies of Science (hereafter NAS) Study (2004) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for 
comprehensive discussions about why the USPTO might issue so many weak patents. The other side of the 
equation is that applicants submit too many applications and many of them are bad. The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) significantly broadened and strengthened the rights of patent holders. The 
rate of patent application filings in the US has been accelerating (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). 
12  It is argued that USPTO cannot retain good examiners and that most examiners have only 2-3 years of 
examination experience. Also examiners might be unfamiliar with new technologies and lack the 
knowledge of where to look for prior art. 
13  The average time allocated for an examiner to address one application is understood to be between 
sixteen and seventeen hours. The NAS study (2004, p51) reports that the number of examiners has not kept 
pace with the number and complexity of patent applications. The number of examiners per 1000 
applications has been declining, while applications have become more complex, as measured by the 
number of claims and prior art citations per application. 
14  See Federal Trade Commission (hereafter FTC) Report (2003).   4
conducts superficial searches and overlooks prior art that could render weak patents 
unpatentable. This situation is not unanimously viewed as problematic. One influential legal 
scholar has argued that US examiners “are ‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of 
patents,…, because it is too costly for them to discover those facts” (Lemley, 2001). He 
argues that, given the skewed nature of patent value, society is better off if economizing on 
USPTO examinations and deferring rigorous determination of validity until the patent enters 
litigation.
15  An alternative reason for the issuance of weak patents is an alleged pro-applicant 
bias of policies and procedures at the USPTO. Critics observe that since the 1980’s the 
USPTO’s culture, mission and incentives have been re-oriented towards issuing patents and 
serving the interests of patent applicants (denoted “customers” by the USPTO), and that US 
examiners are encouraged by various institutional incentives and protocols to accept 
applications that they perceive to be ineligible  (Jaffe  and  Lerner,  2004).                               
In this paper, we investigate whether US patent examiners are “rationally ignorant”, or 
whether they can and do distinguish strong applications from weak ones and conduct their 
examinations accordingly. Specifically, we ask whether a US examiner’s behavior in prior art 
search betrays his assessment of an application’s patentability. The basic idea is the following: 
if an examiner initiating two independent applications is “rationally ignorant,” then it is 
plausible that he spends the same, and limited, amount of time on each application and stops 
his search when the search time runs out, regardless of their patentability. Understandably, in 
neither of the two cases is his search thorough; and due to the stochastic nature of the results 
of prior art searches,
16  one resulting patent likely has a higher share of prior art missed by the 
examiner than the other. We would then expect the patent with a higher share of missed prior 
art to be weaker, in the sense that it is more likely that prior art exists and be discovered later 
and used to invalidate it. Indeed, a view commonly held by scholars and practitioners is that if 
a patent has a larger amount of cited prior art, it has a higher likelihood of being validated.
17 
                                                        
15  Lemley (2001) argues that strengthening the examination process is not cost effective, since very few 
patents are actually litigated or licensed; most patents simply sit on a shelf unused, or are used only for 
noncontroversial purposes, like financing. Because of this, society would be better off spending its 
resources on more judicial inquiries of validity of those few cases in which it matters, rather than paying for 
more protracted examination of all patents ex ante. 
16  For instance, a prior art search might miss a larger share of prior art if it is more difficult to find the 
application’s prior art or it happens that the examiner conducts the search on Friday afternoon. 
17  Moore (2003) argues that “patents that include more citations or more diverse citations are more likely   5
Suppose instead that the examiner, constrained though he may be, can actually 
differentiate between the relative merits of the two applications. How would he decide his 
search effort? The examiner bears the burden of proof of non-patentability and the proof is the 
prior art he searches and obtains.
18 If he is going to grant an application, no proof of 
patentability is needed; but if to reject an application, he needs to provide evidence of prior 
art to show the application is unpatentable. Furthermore, under the various legal, institutional 
and cultural incentives and constraints at the USPTO, which we shall discuss in Section 2, the 
examiner might target the application he deems as less patentable. He might give an easier 
pass to the good application, spending less time on prior art search, so that the resulting patent 
might have a higher share of missed prior art. But for the application he considers weak, the 
examiner, pursuing a rejection, searches harder for prior art to provide proof of 
non-patentability and to show the applicant the difficulty she would face if she chose to 
persist in pursuing the patent. In the end, the weak application is eventually allowed because 
the applicant is persistent and the examiner finally concedes. And we would observe a smaller 
share of missed prior art associated with the resulting patent.   
Therefore, if USPTO examiners are “rationally ignorant,” a patent with a higher share 
of missed prior art might be weaker. However, if examiners do distinguish the relative 
patentability of applications and allocate their search effort accordingly, a higher share of 
missed prior art would suggest a stronger patent. 
How do we test the relationship between the share of missed prior art and the strength 
of a patent? We study a sample of US patents with a USPTO filing date between 1990 and 
1995, for which applications were also filed in the Europe Patent Office (EPO). Outcomes 
from independent EPO application process   are used as indirect indicators of these US 
patents’ strength (patentability).   
For each US patent i in the sample, a Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm, 
which involves linguistic and semantic analysis, is used to retrieve prior patents that are 
linguistically and likely technically similar to, but not cited by, the root patent i. We define 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to be valid.” 
18  USPTO practice requires that examiners articulate their reasons for a rejection, however, examiners 
often say nothing if they chose to allow a case. It is argued that this practice encourages examiners to allow 
rather than to reject applications.   6
these uncited prior patents as a measure of patent i’s missed prior patents. Based on the 
information on the number of missed prior patents (MPPi) and cited prior patents (CPPi), we 
construct a metric, share of missed prior patents (SMPPi), where SMPPi= MPPi/(MPPi+CPPi), 
to proxy for its US examiner’s effort in searching for prior art. 
We find that, for the US patents in our sample, the share of missed prior patents 
(SMPP) can significantly explain the probability of non-withdrawal by applicants and the 
probability of being granted (conditional on non-withdrawal) at the EPO, suggesting that a US 
patent with a higher SMPP is indeed a stronger patent. The most convincing result is from a 
panel data model with US examiner by technology by US application year fixed effects. It 
allows us to identify the effect of SMPP through variations in SMPPs within the set of patents 
examined by the same US examiner, in the same technology field and with the same USPTO 
application year. Similar results also hold when we use a panel data model with US examiner 
by patent assignee fixed effects to control for the possible heterogeneous interactions between 
applicants and US examiners. We also test several alternative rationales for the finding that a 
higher SMPP is positively correlated with the likelihood of an EPO success, and find that they 
are unpersuasive.   
Our results indicate that, by and large, US examiners are not “rationally ignorant.” 
Instead, they can and do distinguish strong applications from weak ones, and conduct their 
searches accordingly. This appears consistent with the postulation in Allison et al. (2004) that 
“the much-maligned PTO is doing a better job than expected in evaluating the patents that 
really matters,” after they find that litigated patents cite more prior art and have a longer 
USPTO examination than a random sample of general patents.   
 Our study offers a piece of empirical evidence that the problem of weak patents in 
the US might be broad and systematic rather than anecdotal. For almost 35% of US patents in 
our sample, their related applications at the EPO failed, and many of these failures are 
predicted by the actions of examiners at the USPTO, who recognized their lack of 
patentability and attempted to reject them by putting more effort in search for prior art. This 
suggests that the USPTO indeed issues patents weaker, on average, than its European 
counterpart. 
Our study suggests that, in regard to reasons for issuing weak patents, the   7
pro-“customer” policy and institutions, which make it difficult for US examiners to reject 
ineligible applications, might be more salient than examiners’ ignorance. Even without 
changing the number of US examiners and the workload and the time allocated for each 
application, the weak patent problem might be significantly addressed just by empowering 
examiners to be able to reject applications that they consider as non-patentable. A tradeoff 
between weeding out weak patents and increasing USPTO expenditure, suggested by the 
“rational ignorance” theory in Lemley (2001), does not appear to exist on the margin. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some institutional 
details at the USPTO to develop our hypothesis about examiner’s search effort and its 
implication for patent strength. Section 3 provides a simple model to illustrate the hypothesis. 
In Section 4 we describe the data and our empirical strategies for testing our hypothesis. We 
present the results in Sections 5 and propose a novel metric for patent strength in Section 6. 
Section 7 discusses the policy implications of our findings and concludes. 
 
2.    Examiners, Examination Procedures and Incentives at the USPTO 
  In this section, we briefly describe some institutional details about examiners, the 
patent examination process, and institutions and incentives for examiners at the USPTO, to 
develop our hypothesis that if US examiners are not “rationally ignorant” and distinguish 
stronger applications from weak ones, they put more effort in search for prior art for 
applications that they think are less patentable. As a result, a patent with a smaller share of 
missed prior art might be weaker. 
 
2.1  Examiners and their burden of proof at the USPTO
19 
The USPTO is currently staffed by over 5477 patent examiners, and has more than 
8900 total full-time equivalent employees. Examiners work together on closely related 
subjects in small groups called art units. Several related art units are organized into a work 
group, and several work groups covering a wide technology area are grouped into a 
                                                        
19  See Cockburn et al. (2003) for more detailed and excellent institutional discussions of the USPTO.   8
technology center. The USPTO has eight technology centers
20 and approximately 271 art 
units. 
Art units are the building blocks of the US patent examination system. Each art unit is 
led by a Supervisory Patent Examiner and contains 10–15 primary and assistant examiners. 
Primary examiners have at least 5 years of experience at the USPTO and have signatory 
authority in granting or rejecting patents. Assistant examiners are junior examiners who are 
like apprentices and must have their examinations reviewed and signed by a primary 
examiner. It takes five to six years for assistant examiners to become primaries. 
The workflow for the patent application process is quite systematic. After being 
received at a central receiving office and passing basic checks to qualify for a filing date, 
patent applications are sorted by the Office of Initial Patent Examination, which allocates 
them to one of the art units. Within the art unit, the Supervisory Patent Examiner looks at the 
invention claimed in the application and assigns it to a specific examiner. The assigned 
examiner will, in most cases, have continuing responsibility for the examination of the 
application. He reads and understands the application, and searches for prior art (including 
previous patents, databases, and journals) to determine if this is patentable, i.e., if it is a novel, 
non-obvious and useful invention.
21 A prior art search typically begins with a review of 
existing US patents in relevant technology classes and subclasses, either through 
computerized tools or by manual examination of hard-copy stacks of issued patents, and may 
then proceed to a search of foreign patent documents, scientific and technical journals, or 
other databases. 
Is the intensity of search independent of the examiner’s judgment of the application? 
An answer is suggested by the following quote from a patent attorney representing 
                                                        
20  The eight technology centers at the USPTO are: 1600 Biotechnology, Organic Chemistry; 1700 
Chemical and Materials Engineering; 2100 Computer Architecture, Software, and Electronic Commerce; 
2600 Communications; 2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components; 3600 
Transportation, Construction, Agriculture, National Security and License and Review; 3700 Mechanical 
Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products; and 2900 Designs for Articles of Manufacture. 
21  When an application is filed, the applicant has no duty to do a thorough search for prior art and disclose 
them to the USPTO, although he has a duty to disclose the prior art of which he is aware that is “material to 
the patentability of the application.” It is the examiner’s responsibility to search for prior art to determine 




“I do not have to prove my invention is patentable. It is the examiner who has to prove 
my invention is unpatentable.”   
 
As suggested, an examiner’s responsibility is to prevent unpatentable applications 
from being granted. It is this function that distinguishes a patent examination system from a 
patent registration system.   
Moreover, the examiner is not allowed to use his “gut feeling” to determine an 
application’s patentability, as suggested by the following quote from an ex-examiner:
23 
 
“I felt very sad when I had a gut feeling about a (bad) application but could not find 
the prior art (to reject it).” 
 
Two messages can be read from the quotes above. First, examiners do form an opinion 
about an application’s patentability during the examination. Second, when an examiner tries 
to reject an application, he bears the burden of proof of non-patentability and must articulate 
his reasons and provide prior art to justify his rejection. By contrast, an allowance of an 
application does not require him to prove anything. With such burden of proof of 
non-patentability, an examiner may search more diligently for prior art when he regards an 
application as unpatentable and considers a rejection.   
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), the official guideline for patent 
examiners, instructs examiners to search for prior art that not only shows the unpatentability 
of original claims in an application but also, in a FOAM of non-final rejection, anticipates 
how the applicant will amend claims in response to the FOAM. The following excerpt is from 
MPEP Section 904.03 on “Conducting the Search”:   
                                                        
22  The quote is from an instructor in a course on patent prosecution that the author audited in the Boalt 
School of Law at UC Berkeley. The instructor is a patent lawyer who taught law students on how to 
prosecute patent applications for their clients. 
23  The quote is from an informal conversation with an ex-examiner at the USPTO, who prefers to remain 
anonymous.   10
 
“It is normally not enough that references be selected to meet only the terms of the 
claims alone, …., the search should, insofar as possible, also cover all subject matter which 
the examiner reasonably anticipates might be incorporated into applicant’s amendment.” 
(Italics added) 
 
The MPEP guidelines suggest that for a very good application, an examiner may not 
need to conduct as thorough a search, because he is about to approve the application, and the 
applicant is less likely to come back. However, if the examiner thinks an application to be 
unpatentable and considers a rejection, he needs to search harder for prior art to demonstrate 
the non-patentability of the original claims and the non-patentability of the anticipated claim 
amendments. All the burden of proof of non-patentability is on the examiner.   
 
2.2 Incentives and constraints in patent examination at USPTO   
After the examiner obtains and reads the prior art, he determines whether the 
application is patentable, and writes a letter of “first office action on merit (FOAM)” to the 
applicant (or normally, the applicant’s attorney) with either a Notice of Allowance or, more 
commonly, a Non-final Rejection. When writing a FOAM of non-final rejection, the examiner 
must write a detailed analysis of the basis for the rejection.
24 The applicant then has a fixed 
length of time to respond by supplying additional arguments and evidence and/or amending 
the claims. After negotiation, the examiner writes a letter of “second and final office action” 
to allow the application or maintain some or all of the initial rejections. This second rejection 
is typically called a “final” rejection. 
An overwhelming majority of applications at the USPTO receive a FOAM of 
non-final rejection, but only a minority of them receives a “final” rejection in the second 
office action. Moreover, a majority of the applications that receive a second and “final” 
rejection ultimately result in a patent, even without amendment.
25 This seemingly puzzling 
                                                        
24  The Manual of Patent Examination Procedures (MPEP), Section 706. 
25  Lemley and Sampat (2007) find that in their sample, 86.5% of the applications received a first office 
action on merit (FOAM) of a non-final rejection, but only 34.5% received a “final” rejection in the 
subsequent action. Subsequently, 52.9% of those applications that received a “final” rejection ultimately   11
fact could be, at least partly, explained by the cultural, procedural and institutional incentives 
at the USPTO that encourage examiners to grant, rather than continue in trying to reject 
applications from persistent applicants. 
The compensation and promotion schemes for individual USPTO examiners provide 
incentives for them to process applications as quickly as possible, by allowing them. For each 
examiner, the USPTO sets a productivity goal specifying the number of hours he is to spend 
on an average application. In practice, the productivity goal is specified as a certain number of 
points that the examiner is supposed to earn, calculated on a biweekly basis (the “biweekly 
production goal”). The examiner is awarded a point when he either writes a FOAM or 
disposes of an application (the application being either abandoned, allowed, or appealed to the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interference in which case the examiner needs to write an 
Examiner’s Answer in response). But no points are awarded for all other actions including: (1) 
a second, third, etc., action on the merits; (2) a final rejection; (3) an interview (in person or 
by telephone); and (4) an Advisory Action. The biweekly production goal is based on the 
examiner’s technology area and his experience level (primary or assistant examiner). If he 
exceeds 110% of his production goal, the examiner receives a bonus.
26 
 The USPTO also implements various internal assessments to ensure “examination 
quality control” through auditing an examiner’s work. The primary quality indicator is the 
examiner’s error rate.
27  The USPTO quality review specialists calculate this rate by analyzing 
a sample of allowed patents for patentability issues, such as the adequacy of the examiner’s 
search and the originality of the applicant’s claims, and determining the percentage of patents 
that contain at least one claim that would be held invalid in a court of law.
28 There are 
informal “controls” of examination quality as well. For instance, the examiner might care 
                                                                                                                                                                             
result in a patent, and another 20% are still pending. 56.7% of the applications issued are issued without 
any amendment. 66.1% of those which are amended after a final rejection are patented. 
26  For a detailed discussion of USPTO examiners’ biweekly production goal and the reward system see a 
report (2004) by the Office of Inspector General, US Department of Commerce, (hereafter the OIG Report 
(2004).  
27  Other indicators include: (1) USPTO reopens applications based upon applications sampled for post 
review; (2) the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences reviews adverse patentability decisions; and (3) 
the examiner’s grant rate. (The Office of Inspector General Report (2004), p.14). 
28  The error rate reported in USPTO quality assessment audits rose slightly during the 1990s, but has only 
ranged between 3.6% and 7% since 1980.   12
about his reputation and “does not want his patent to be the one that hit newspapers.”
29 With 
these “quality control” mechanisms in place, the examiner likely targets applications that he 
considers to be unpatentable, for which he searches harder for prior art to prove their 
unpatentability. 
Moreover, certain examination procedures at the USPTO allow an applicant 
essentially unlimited attempts to persuade a critical examiner to approve a patent, making it 
impossible for the examiner to ever finally reject a bad application if the applicant is 
persistent. As Lemley and Moore (2003) observe, “One of the oddest things about the US 
patent system is that it is impossible for the USPTO to ever finally reject a patent application. 
While patent examiners can refuse to allow an applicant’s claim to ownership of a particular 
invention, and can even issue what are misleadingly called ‘final rejections’, the applicant 
always gets another chance to persuade the patent examiner to change his mind.” The term 
“final rejection” is a classic legal misnomer.
30 The applicant receiving a second and final 
rejection has several options: 1) she can continue to negotiate with the examiner by 
submitting claim amendments, evidence and arguments; 2) she can request a face-to-face or 
telephone interview with the examiner to try to persuade the examiner in person; or 3) she 
may choose to appeal the rejection. In these cases, the examiner is awarded no points until the 
application is disposed of. Alternatively, the applicant can start the examination process over 
by filing a Request for Continuation Examination (RCE), or application continuation.
31 
Furthermore, beginning in the early 1990s, the US Congress converted the USPTO 
from an agency funded by tax revenue to one funded by the fees it collects. The USPTO has 
since increasingly viewed itself as an organization whose mission is to serve its “customer”, 
patent applicants who want their applications granted.
32 This new orientation creates strong 
incentives for the USPTO to process applications as quickly as possible. Examiners have 
                                                        
29  The quote is from an informal conversation with an ex-examiner at the USPTO. 
30  See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (p116, 3
rd edition, 2003) 
(“The label ‘final rejection’ is a misnomer if ever there was one.”) 
31  Application continuations permit an applicant to re-file a pending application and avoid the 
implementation of a patent examiner’s decision. There are three types of continuations: Continuation 
Application, Continuation-In-Part, and Division. Applicants can also file a “Request Continuation 
Examination”. See Lemley and Moore (2003) for a detailed discussion about the problem of application 
continuation. 
32  See Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a history of how the USPTO has become more service-oriented.   13
reportedly been criticized by their supervisors for undertaking too many reviews of prior art 
before issuing a patent.
33 
With all these institutional and cultural barriers to reject an application, all an 
examiner can do when attempting to reject an unpatentable application is to search for more 
prior art to increase the difficulty, delay and cost
34 for an applicant should she choose to 
persist, and perhaps to persuade her to narrow the claims in the application. The examiner 
hopes that such deterrence will lead to a more speedy disposal of the application. Should the 
applicant persist, however, it is costly for the examiner to engage in back-and-forth 
negotiations with the applicant; it consumes time and does not earn the examiner production 
points.  
 Although the examiner might ultimately grant a weak patent due to the applicant’s 
persistence, the fact that he conducted a more thorough search for prior art reflects his view 
that the application is relatively weak. Thus, the examiner’s search effort might be a signal of 
patent strength. This is the hypothesis explored in this study.
35 
 
3.  A Simple Model 
We use a simple model to illustrate the hypothesis presented in the Section 2. Define 
the underlying patentability of a US application i as a random variable Pi, with a normal 
distribution
36  that is common knowledge: 
                                                        
33  Here are selected and very possibly non-representative quotes from PTO examiners: (1) We have a 
cultural goal now. If some examiner is not issuing enough, his SPE (supervisory patent examiner) will 
complain and make her or him feel like s/he’s a weirdo anal retentive tight butt…. The examiner wonders 
why s/he is working so hard. The examiner wonders why s/he draws complaints from the boss…. (2) We 
just don’t fight hard enough against the bull- being shoveled by upper management…. And why should you 
care? Hey, management pays you for good patents or bad, right? Why should you fight with management? 
Why reject? (These comments are taken from Gregory Aharonian, “A Few Patent Examiners Complain 
about Patent Quality,” PATNEWS, January 28, 1999. 
34  The lengthy examination is costly for applicants because patent lawyers who represent applicants charge 
fees according to the hours they spend on the case. 
35  Our hypothesis postulates that if an application is less novel or more obvious, the resulting patent has a 
smaller share of missed prior art. In another scenario, when an application has excessively broad claims, the 
examiner might conduct a more thorough search for prior art to narrow down the claims in the issued patent. 
This scenario could create a bias against our finding that a US patent with a higher share of missed prior art 
is more likely to succeed at the EPO, as this application with broad claims is likely to be narrowed down 
and issued at the EPO as well, and thus the share of missed prior art would have no explanatory power in 
its EPO application outcome.   
36  If we prefer an application’s patentability to have a range of [0, ∞), we can consider Pi as the logarithm 
of the underlying patentability that has a lognormal distribution.   14
( 1 )       
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Suppose that Qi is the signal about the patentability of the application i. Qi is also a 
random variable in the sense that people may receive different signals of this patentability. We 
assume that Qi has the following conditional distribution (conditional on the true underlying 
patentability Pi) that is also normal and common knowledge: 
(2)         
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The US examiner reads the application i and receives a signal about its patentability, qi, 
which is a realization of the random variable Qi. We can think of qi as the examiner’s 
perception about the application’s patentability.
37 With this perceived patentability qi and the 
common prior belief about the true patentability Pi, the examiner forms his posterior belief 
about Pi, shown in Equation (3). 
( 3 )       
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The examiner then decides how much effort he wants to put in search for prior art. The 
search effort is e with a support [0,1]. 
 The USPTO has a patentability threshold p*. For the examiner, granting an 
application with a patentability Pi below the threshold p* incurs a cost, either because the 
quality assessment office or other people will with some probability detect the mistake later or 
the examiner might just feel bad for not meeting his job responsibility. We assume a constant 
cost C1 for granting an application whose Pi is below p*.  
To try to put an end to an application that the examiner deems unpatentable, he 
conducts a more diligent search for prior art, not only to show a proof of non-patentability, but 
perhaps more importantly, to deter the applicant from persisting in pursuing the patent. If the 
applicant is determined, she can keep coming back over and over again. Suppose that the 
probability of the applicant being persistent D is inversely dependent on the share of prior art 
the examiner has found, which is in turn determined by the search effort ei, in a simple form 
                                                        
37  For simplicity, the model assumes that the examiner receives the signal and decides his search effort 
once and for all. Alternatively, the examiner, during the search, could do Bayesian updating of his 
perception of patentability and adjust his search effort accordingly. By contrast, the theory of “rational 
ignorance” postulates that the examiner does not link his search effort to the patentability of the application.   15
D(ei)=(1-ei).
38, 39 
However, the search effort is costly to the examiner, as a higher search effort 
consumes more time and thus reduces the points he will earn towards his biweekly production 
goal. We assume the cost of search effort to be C(ei)=C0 ei
2, where C0 is a constant. In our 
study, the examiner’s search effort e is measured by the share of prior art that is cited in the 
resulting patent.   
Given his perception about application i’s patentability qi, and his posterior belief 
about the underlying patentability f(Pi|qi), the examiner decides his search effort, ei, which 
minimizes the sum of the cost of search and the expected cost of approving application i: 
(4)        min   
*
2
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p
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where the probability of granting the application i when its Pi below p* is 
*
() ( | )( | )
p
ii i i i D ef P q d P q
−∞ ∫ , the product of the probability of the applicant being persistent (in 
which case the examiner has to grant) and the probability of Pi being smaller than p*. 
The examiner solves this cost minimization problem and decides his search effort, ei, 
which is given by Equation (5).   


















where  Φ() is the cdf function for a normal distribution. 
The derivative of ei with respect to qi is negative, meaning that if the examiner 
perceives application i to have higher patentability, he will use less search effort. 
Understandably, the examiner will take more search effort if the USPTO sets a higher 
patentability standard p*. The examiner’s search effort is also higher if the cost of granting an 
undeserved patent is higher or if the search cost is lower: 









                                                        
38  Since an applicant can always obtain a patent if he is persistent and willing to spend time and money to 
contest a rejection, the patentability of the application per se does not affect his decision on whether to fight. 
It is the difficulty and cost of persuading the examiner, reflected by the prior art cited by the examiner, that 
matter to the applicant.   
39  The probability of the applicant being persistent could also depend on the application’s potential 
commercial value, which we assume away in the model, for simplicity. This simplification does not change 
the results of the model   16









 As outside researchers, we observe the prior art cited by the examiner and we have 
an estimate of missed prior art. These two pieces of information can be used to construct an 
indicator of the examiner’s search effort ei. The question is, what is the conditional 
expectation of the true patentability Pi, conditional on ei (i.e., E[Pi|ei])? 
Given  ei, we can derive qi, the examiner’s perception of the patentability, from 
Equation (5): 































-1() is the inverse of the cdf function of a normal distribution.   
After we derive qi(ei), we can, from the conditional distribution f(Pi|qi) presented in 
Equation (3), infer the expectation of the underlying patentability Pi, conditional on ei, i.e., 
E[Pi|ei]. 















As shown in Equation (11), the derivative of E[Pi|ei] with respect to ei is negative, 
meaning that if we observe that a US patent has a higher search effort ei, the conditional 
expectation of its underlying patentability (E[Pi|ei]) should be lower. 
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Thus, the model illustrates that if a US examiner has a good assessment about the 
patentability of an application, he would conduct a less diligent search for prior art if he 
perceives it to be more patentable. As a result, we would expect a patent with a higher share 
of missed prior art to be a stronger patent.
40 On the contrary, if the examiner is “rationally 
                                                        
40  In this simplified model, we assume that whether an application is granted by the USPTO is only 
determined by the applicant’s persistence, which is in turn determined by the examiner’s search effort and   17
ignorant” and allocates the same amount of time to each application, a patent with a higher 
share of missed prior art might be weaker. Therefore, an empirical study of the relationship 
between a patent’s share of missed prior art and its strength would be an indirect test of 
whether US examiners are “rationally ignorant.” 
 
4.    Empirical Strategies and Data Description 
How do we empirically test whether a higher share of missed prior art, indicates a 
stronger or weaker patent? First, we need a sample of US patents and some indicators of 
which are stronger and which are weaker. Second, for each of these US patents, we need to 
know how much prior art is cited and how much has been missed by its US examiner during 
the examination, so that the share of missed prior art can be constructed. 
 
4.1  Use of international patenting to distinguish stronger US patents from weaker ones 
Ideally, we would like to have a random sample of US patents drawn from the whole 
US patent pool and have them either examined again with a perfect re-examination at the 
USPTO or litigated for validity in the court with an ideal trial. The outcomes of the USPTO 
re-examinations or the validity decisions by the court would tell us their patent strength.   
Since 1981, the USPTO has had a reexamination process available at any time during 
a patent’s life. However, the US reexamination has serious disincentives and drawbacks and is 
almost dysfunctional.
41 Patent litigation data, which contain only a small fraction of patents 
that are highly selected, might be too complex and biased to be suitable for our purpose. Only 
1.5% of US patents are ever litigated, and only 0.1% of patents are ever litigated to trial.
42 All 
litigation could be viewed as a failure to settle. Those that finally reach a court decision are 
extremely selected: both sides must have a strong belief that the expected value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the invention’s commercial value. In a more complicated model where the application’s patentability plays 
a role in both the USPTO’s decision to grant and the applicant’s decision to persist, the relationship 
between the examiner’s search effort and patent strength may not be as straightforward. A patent with a 
higher search effort has two competing implications: (1) the examiner perceives it to be less patentable, but 
(2) it survived a more rigorous examination with more prior art being reviewed. The results from a more 
complicated model might be ambiguous. 
41  See Graham et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion and an interesting comparison of USPTO 
re-examination and EPO opposition. Also, see Merges (1999). 
42  Lemley and Shapiro (2005), p75.   18
outcome is high; otherwise they would have settled before the trial to save millions of dollars 
of cost.   
In this paper, we instead look at the cases where an inventor files applications, with the 
same priority date, in multiple patent offices.
43  We study a sample of 22,300 US inventions
44 
that filed and obtained US patents at the USPTO, and also filed applications, through 
non-PCT filings, at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO).
45 
The US patents in our sample cover 30 distinct technology fields,
46 and their USPTO 
application years range from 1990 through 1995.   
In this paper, we focus on the EPO application outcomes of the US patents in the 
sample, because the application process at the JPO has its own peculiarities that complicate 
the issues.
47 Since the EPO applies patentability standards broadly similar to that of the 
USPTO,
48,49 and the independent EPO examination could be considered as a second trial of 
the patentability of an invention claimed in a US patent, and EPO application outcomes might 
betray the strength of the patent.
50 Moreover, since the EPO has been widely viewed as 
                                                        
43  Studies that make use of international patenting include Graham et al. (2002) who study US 
re-examination and EPO opposition process by matching EPO patents to their “equivalent” US patents, 
Graham and Harhoff (2006) studying a set of litigated US patents and their “equivalent” EPO applications, 
and Jensen et al. (2006) who document the disharmony in application outcomes by international patenting 
offices. 
44  These inventions are defined as US inventions because they have only US inventors and filed 
applications at the USPTO first.   
45  Our data is a subset of the larger dataset compiled by Jensen et al. (2006). See Jensen et al. (2006) for a 
detailed description of their dataset and the variables in the data. This study focuses on US inventions only, 
because they provide a clear timeline of the application process both at the USPTO and the EPO, discussed 
in subsection 4.2. 
46  The 30 technology fields are Office of Science and Technology (OST) technology groups, following 
Jensen et al. (2006). See Office of Science and Technology, Department of Trade and Industry, United 
Kingdom classification. See http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/statistics.shtml#patents for details of the 
classification system. We also use the 6 Technology Categories and 36 Sub-Categories in Hall et al. (2001) 
to categorize technology fields, and the results remain similar. 
47  For instance, an applicant could wait up to seven years to request an examination, until which point the 
application just sits at the JPO. It is very likely that what happens at the JPO, to a large degree, depends on 
what happened at the USPTO and the EPO. Studying the interactions among application processes at the 
Triadic patent office might be an interesting research line in its own right, which we shall pursue in the 
future.   
48  The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) require that all signatories to 
the agreement apply the criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and utility to determine whether an invention 
is eligible for a patent (TRIPS Article 27). Specifically, EPO patents are issued for inventions that are novel, 
mark an inventive step, are commercially applicable, and are not excluded from patentability for other 
reasons (Article 52 EPC). 
49  There remain certain differences between the USPTO and the EPO, mostly in patentable subject matter. 
For example, software and genes are considered as subject matters that are less patentable at the EPO. 
50  An analogy is two independent blood tests at two hospitals for the cholesterol level.   19
having more rigorous examinations and better performance than the USPTO,
51 an  application 
related to a stronger US patents is more likely to survive at the EPO. In both cases, the 
outcome of an EPO application might signal the strength (validity) of the corresponding US 
patent.  
Note that the US patents in our sample are also selected in the sense that (1) inventions 
in our sample sought patent protection in both the USPTO and the EPO through a non-PCT 
filing. They might differ from those seeking only a US patent, or from those filing a PCT 
application, in regard to potential commercial value or patentability; and (2) the sample does 
not include inventions associated with applications that were filed with the USPTO, but 
rejected.
52, 53  Given these sample selection phenomena, we should use caution in interpreting 
our findings.   
 
4.2 The EPO application process   
For a US inventor who files applications in both the USPTO and the EPO, the time 
line of the application process is illustrated in Figure 1. The applicant usually files an 
application at the USPTO first, where an examination automatically ensues, needing no 
further request from the applicant. Within one year from the US filing date, the applicant 
needs to file with the EPO in order to claim the US priority date. Upon receiving the 
application, a centralized EPO search office in The Hague, Netherlands, conducts search for 
prior art, writes a search report that cites the relevant prior art that the search found, and 
publishes the search report.
54 Within 6 months after the search report is published, the 
applicant must decide whether to file a request for examination and pay the examination fee. 
                                                        
51  The grant rate for the USPTO in 1993-1998, corrected for continuing applications, ranges from 80% to 
97%. In contrast, the grant rates for the EPO and the JPO from 1995-1999 (averaged) are 67% and 64%, 
respectively. (Quillen and Webster (2001)). 
52  Before 2000, the USPTO only published issued patents and did not publish applications that were 
rejected by the USPTO. Thus, we do not have information about rejected applications filed at the USPTO 
before 2000. 
53  The second selection issue might not be significant, given estimates of the grant rates at the USPTO 
based on original applications could be as high as 95% (Quillen and Webster, 2001). Even with a lower 
bound of the USPTO grant rate of 75-80%, the second selection problem might not be serious, as 
applications that are Non-PCT filings may have a higher grant rate than the general USPTO applications. 
54  The search report is published either together with the publication of the application if the report is 
available by the due publication date for the application (18 months after the claimed priority date), or 
alone otherwise.   20
Upon receiving the request, an EPO examiner (different from the searcher) starts the 
examination of its patentability. If no request is made, the application is deemed as withdrawn 
by the EPO. Starting from the third year from the EPO filing date, the applicant must pay 
annual fees to keep the application alive until the application is disposed of at the EPO. The 
applicant may decide to withdraw the application at any time during the EPO examination. 
Meanwhile, the issuance of the US patent can occur at any time during the EPO examination.   
There are three EPO application outcomes of interest: withdrawn by applicants, 
granted or rejected by the EPO.
55 These are sequential events: an applicant first decides 
whether to withdraw her application and, conditional on a non-withdrawal, the decision of 
grant or rejection by the EPO is then observed. Figure 2 illustrates the sequential events 
associated with an application at the EPO.   
As shown in Table 1, overall only 60.2% of the US patents in our sample have a 
corresponding application granted at the EPO; 28.3% withdrawn and 5.8% rejected, 
respectively. The EPO grant rates vary significantly across different technology fields, 
ranging from 44% to 75.6%. The technologies with the top three grant rates are handling 
printing (75.64%), transport (72.7%), and agricultural food (71.6%). The bottom three 
technologies are semiconductors (44%), pharmaceuticals (45.4%), and information 
technology (51.4%). The EPO grant rates also vary by years, between 51.5% to 65.5%.   
 
4.3  Information about prior art obtained and missed by US examiners 
To construct a measure of the US examiner’ effort in search for prior art for a US 
patent, we need information about the prior art the examiner actually obtains through his 
search and the prior art he misses.   
With regard to the former, on the front page of a US patent document there is a 
reference section where prior art is cited by the examiner. An applicant has the “duty to 
disclose” prior art of which he is aware (though no duty to conduct a thorough search for prior 
art), therefore the cited prior art on the front page of a US patent may contain both prior art 
disclosed by the applicant, and prior art obtained by the examiner through the search; these 
                                                        
55  See Jensen et al. (2006) for a more detailed discussion of categorizing these three EPO application 
outcomes.   21
cannot be distinguished for US patents in our sample.
56  
Using all prior art cited on the front page of a US patent to proxy for the prior art that 
the examiner (rather than the applicant) actually identifies through his search may not be a 
serious problem for our study, for two reasons. First, it is possible that the examiner would 
have obtained some applicant-disclosed prior art through the search, had the applicant not 
disclosed it. In other words, some applicant-disclosed prior art might just be a substitute for 
what the examiner would have obtained. More importantly, using all cited prior art, instead of 
the prior art obtained by the examiner induces a bias against our results in Section 4 and 
renders the results even more significant. There is evidence that applicants care more about 
applications that are more original and more important, for which applicants tend to conduct a 
search for prior art and disclose more prior art to the USPTO (Sampat 2005)
57, 58. Therefore, a 
“better” application might have more applicant-disclosed prior art that, ceteris paribus, would 
render the resulting patent, which is a stronger patent, to have an understated share of missed 
prior art and an overstated examiner search effort. This would bias against our findings in 
Section 4 that a stronger patent has a higher share of missed prior art. In other words, if we 
had information about the prior art obtained by examiners through their search, and used it to 
construct the variable (the share of missed prior art), our results would have been even 
stronger  and  more  significant.    
Regarding prior art missed by US examiners during their searches, it is very difficult 
and expensive, if not impossible, to get precise information about missed prior art for a large 
sample of US patents. There is no way, other than reading patent claims in detail and applying 
perfect judgment, to identify exactly which prior art is relevant and missing. Patent lawyers 
                                                        
56  Starting from 2001, applicant-referenced prior art and examiner-referenced prior art are distinguished in 
a US patent. But the patents in our sample were filed at the USPTO during the period of 1990-1995. 
57  Sampat (2005) discusses the incentives and disincentives for applicants to search for prior art and 
disclose to the USPTO. He finds that, after controlling for technology fields, patent applicants devote more 
effort to identifying prior art for more technologically and commercially valuable inventions, measured by 
forward citations (citations cited by subsequent patents), 4
th year patent renewal and patent family size. He 
also finds that in so-called “complex product” industries (i.e. electronics, computers and telecommunication 
technologies), where patenting is mostly for “strategic” purposes of preserving freedom to practice and 
used as bargaining chips in cross-licensing and where firms care more about the quantity of patents than 
about obtaining “quality” patents, applicants are less likely to search for prior art. 
58  The findings in Sampat (2005) are consistent with our informal discussions with some ex patent lawyers. 
Large companies tend to file thousands of patent applications at the USPTO each year, for which they tend 
to disclose no prior art to the USPTO. Alcacer and Gittleman (2004) study a random sample of 1,500 US 
patents over the period 2001-2003 and find that 40% of them have no prior art cited by applicants.   22
try to do this in patent litigation, for which they charge high fees. As an alternative, our study 
relies on a sophisticated Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), also known as Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) analysis, to determine how closely related other patents are to a given 
patent (hereafter, root patent) and thus identify the missed prior patents of the root patent.
59 
When a prior patent satisfies a particular threshold of linguistic similarity to the root patent 
and is not cited by the root patent, it will be flagged as a missed prior patent of the root 
patent.
60, 61 The LSA analysis used in the paper was kindly provided by M-CAM, a 
Charlottesville, VA-based patent analysis firm, which employed its own NLP algorithm to 
identify missed prior patents for each US patent in our sample.
62, 63 
For each patent i in the sample, in addition to “M-CAM missed prior patents” (MPP), 
the M-CAM analysis also provides two more pieces of information that we use in the study. 
The first piece is “M-CAM linguistically linked prior patents” (LLPP), all the prior patents 
that the M-CAM Latent Semantic Analysis identifies as linguistically linked to, but not cited 
by, the patent i. LLPPs are located by the M-CAM algorithm using a much lower threshold of 
linguistic similarity than MPPs and used as a proxy for difficulty of finding prior patents.
64 
                                                        
59  For an explanation and application of the NLP analysis, visit http://www.cognition.com/info/how.html. In 
addition to M-CAM (www.m-cam.com) that does a NLP analysis for the US patents in our sample, there are 
other companies whose business is based on NLP. Among them is Cognition Technologies, Inc. 
(www.cognition.com). 
60  Note that the M-CAM analysis only searches patent documents to retrieve what it deems as “missed 
prior patents”, and we don’t have data on other types of missed prior art, such as missed journal articles. In 
this paper, we use only information about cited prior patents and M-CAM missed prior patents to measure 
US examiners’ search effort. It is widely viewed and empirically confirmed that US examiners’ searches are 
primarily focused on patent documents, particularly on US patents (Sampat 2005). Thus, measuring an 
examiner’ search effort using the number of cited prior patents and the number of missed prior patents 
appears reasonable, if not ideal. 
 
61  The paper reports the results with examiners’ search effort measured by the number of cited prior US 
patents and the number of missed prior US patents. Using all the cited and missed prior patents (US, EP, 
Japanese and other national patents) might have a potential double counting problem, because one prior 
invention might be protected in multiple jurisdictions. The results with the latter measure of examiners’ 
search effort, not reported here, are similar. 
62  The analysis algorithm of M-CAM is a trade secret, and detailed information about the algorithm is 
therefore unavailable. However, the firm indicates that the algorithm incorporates elements of latent 
semantic analysis as well as employing patent-specific bibliographical information to determine 
relationships between patents. 
63  Of course, the M-CAM algorithm is not comparable to a legal and technical assessment of what are 
missed prior patents. However, on average, and over a large data set, the algorithm could provide useful 
information about technically related but uncited prior patents. 
64  Analogous to those hundreds of links that appear if we do a Google search using some keywords, these 
linguistically linked prior patents (LLPP) can be considered as the pool of potential prior patents that the 
US examiner gets with a first round of search using some keywords, from which the examiner then has to 
figure out the “true” prior patents.   23
The second piece of information relates to the subsequent patents that might have built on 
root patent i and should have cited patent i but did not. We call them “M-CAM unciting 
subsequent patents,” as opposed to those subsequent patents that cite the root patent (hereafter 
citing subsequent patents). We combine a patent’s “citing subsequent patents” and “M-CAM 
unciting subsequent patents” together and use these “total subsequent patents” as a possibly 
more accurate measure for the importance and value of the patent.
 65 Appendix 1 gives a 
more comprehensive description of the information obtained from the M-CAM analysis. 
We conduct a case study to check how good the M-CAM LSA analysis is, i.e., how 
likely the M-CAM missed prior patents are the “true” missed prior patents. Listed in Table 2 
are six high-profile patents that have been revoked by the USPTO after re-examinations, 
thanks to the validity challenges brought by PubPat, a non-profit organization representing the 
public interest and specializing in challenging undeserved patents that are both economically 
and socially significant.
66 In three out of six cases, the true missed prior patents that were 
used by PubPat to invalidate those undeserved patents are included in the “M-CAM missed 
prior patents”. In five out of six cases, the true invalidating prior patents are included in the 
broader class, “M-CAM linguistically linked prior patents.” Thus, we have some confidence 
that M-CAM algorithm does a reasonably good job in locating missed prior patents. 
  Figure 3 shows the histograms of the number of cited prior patents and the number of 
M-CAM missed prior patents for the US patents in the sample. Both distributions are 
concentrated in the range of 1-50 and show significant levels of dispersion, suggesting that 
the M-CAM algorithm achieves a degree of discrimination’ it does not mechanically retrieve a 
roughly similar number of prior patents for each US patent in the sample. 
  
4.4  Measurement for US examiner’s search effort: share of missed prior art   
For each US patent i in our sample, based on the number of the cited prior patents 
(CPPi) on the front page and the number of M-CAM missed prior patents (MPPi), we 
construct a variable, share of missed prior patents (SMPPi), where SMPPi= 
                                                        
65  It has been suggested that if a patent has more citing subsequent patents and/or the citing subsequent 
patents spread over more diverse technology fields, the patent is more important and more valuable. See 
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and cited references there. 
66  For more information about PubPat and those revoked patents, visit http://www.pubpat.org/.   24
MPPi/(MPPi+CPPi) and (MPPi+CPPi) is the number of total prior patents. We are interested in 
whether a higher SMPPi suggests a stronger or weaker patent.   
A key advantage of using “M-CAM missed prior patents” is that, for the US patents in 
our sample, this information is observed only by us and was not known by either applicants or 
examiners in any patent offices. Thus, it has no direct impact on decisions by applicants and 
patent examiners.
67 However, note that the set of M-CAM missed prior patents is not the 
“true” set of missed prior patents in a definitive sense. The constructed variable, SMPPi is a 
noisy measure of US examiner’s search effort, which could lead to a potential attenuation 
problem. This potential attenuation problem, caused by a noisy SMPP, might lead to 
understatement of the significance of the results, reported later.   
Figure 4 provides graphic evidence that a higher SMPP suggests a stronger patent. It 
compares mean differences in SMPPs between US patents with different EPO application 
outcomes. We consider three comparisons: (1) the US patents that were not withdrawn at the 
EPO versus those withdrawn, (2) those granted by the EPO versus those rejected, conditional 
on non-withdrawal, and (3) those successful (granted) at the EPO versus those failed (either 
rejected or withdrawn).   
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the mean differences in SMPPs for the three comparisons 
for US patents in each of the 30 technology fields. A solid circle indicates a significant 
difference from zero at 5% level, while a hollow circle indicates an insignificant difference. In 
7 out of 30 technology fields,
68 the US patents that were not withdrawn at the EPO have a 
significantly higher mean value in SMPP than those withdrawn; and in no fields, did those not 
withdrawn have a significantly lower mean SMPP relative to those withdrawn. The mean 
differences in SMPP between those granted and those rejected (conditional on a 
non-withdrawal) are significantly positive for 6 technology fields
69  and insignificant for other 
technologies. In 10 out of the 30 technology fields,
70 the differences in the average SMPP 
                                                        
67  M-CAM started its patent analysis business in 1999. 
68  Those technology fields include telecommunications, optics, organic fine chemicals, macromolecular 
polymer, surfaces coatings, transport and nuclear engineering. 
69  The fields include electrical devices, medical engineering, biotechnology, materials metallurgy, space 
technology weapons, and civil engineering building mining. 
70  The fields include electrical devices, telecommunications, medical engineering, organic fine chemicals, 
macromolecular polymer, materials metallurgy, surfaces coatings, transport, nuclear engineering, and civil 
engineering building mining.   25
between the success (granted) group and the failure (rejected or withdrawn) group are 
significantly positive, and in no field is a significantly negative difference observed. 
Panel B of Figure 4 shows the mean differences in SMPPs for the three comparisons 
for US patents with each of the six USPTO application years (1990-1995). In 5 out of the 6 
years, US patents that are not withdrawn at the EPO have a significantly higher mean SMPP 
than those withdrawn; and only for year 1992, the difference is insignificantly positive. The 
differences in average SMPP for those granted and those rejected by the EPO (conditional on 
non-withdrawal) are significantly positive in two years (1990 and 1994), insignificantly 
positive in three years (1991, 1993 and 1995), and insignificantly negative only in 1992. In 
five out of the six years there are significantly positive mean differences in SMPP between the 
success (granted by the EPO) and failure (withdrawn or rejected) groups; the mean difference 
is insignificantly positive only in 1992. 
 
4.5 Control  variables 
With regard to control variables, we use the number of “M-CAM linguistically linked 
prior patents” (LLPP) as a proxy for difficulty of finding relevant prior inventions. We also 
control for other characteristics of an invention that may influence applicants’ behavior or 
have impacts on EPO decisions. For instance, the higher commercial value an applicant 
believes his invention has, the more likely he is to be persistent and spend more money to get 
a European patent. As a result, the probabilities of not being withdrawn and being granted by 
the EPO (conditional on a non-withdrawal) might be higher if commercial value is higher. 
Specifically, for each US patent in the sample, we include the following control variables:
71 
(1) The number of claims in the US patent,   
(2) The number of US classifications the US patent belongs to, 
(3) The number of inventors listed in the US patent, 
(4) The number of assignees listed in the US patent, 
(5) The number of total prior patents (both cited and missed prior patents), 
                                                        
71  We use “total prior patents” and “total subsequent patents” to construct control variables in the list 
because they, unlike “cited prior patents” and “citing subsequent patents” that are decided by examiners, 
are exogenous. As checks on the robustness of our results, we also use “cited prior patents” and “citing 
subsequent patents” to construct control variables and the results are similar.   26
(6) The number of US classifications that these prior patents belong to,
72 
(7) The number of total subsequent patents (both citing and unciting subsequent 
patents).  
(8) The number of US classifications these subsequent patents belong to,
73 
(9) Three potential indicators of the technology stage of the US patent, i.e., whether 
it is at an early or late stage in its own technological trajectory: Innovation stage (the 
number of total prior patents over the number of total subsequent patents), Lag to total 
prior patents (the length of the period between the average issue date of the total prior 
patents and the issue date of the US patent), and Lag of total subsequent patents (the lag 
between the issue date of the US patent and the average issue date of the total subsequent 
patents). If the first two indicators are larger, the patent might be in a later stage, while a 
larger third indicator might suggest an earlier invention. 
 
5. Empirical Strategies and Results 
In this section, we first describe our empirical strategies used in testing the 
relationship between SMPP and patent strength. We then present the empirical results that, for 
US patents with a higher SMPP, their related EPO applications are more likely not to be 
withdrawn by applicants and, conditional on non-withdrawal, more likely to receive patents at 
the EPO. Our interpretation of these results is that a higher SMPP indicates a stronger patent. 
We then test three alternative explanations for the finding that a US patent with a higher 
SMPP is more likely to succeed at the EPO and find them implausible. Finally, we have a few 
robustness checks and further verify our results. 
  
5.1 Empirical strategies 
A patent i’s share of missed prior patents, SMPPi, is not only a function of the 
                                                        
72  Also, following Hall et al. (2001), we construct an originality variable based on the US classifications 
that the prior patents belong to. We also use the originality variable that is constructed by Hall et al. (2001). 
In both cases, the results still hold. 
73  We also, following Hall et al. (2001), construct a generality variable based on the US classifications that 
the subsequent patents belong to, and the results still hold. We did not use the generality variable in Hall et 
al. (2001), because the US patents in our sample were issued from mid 1990s onward and would have 
many subsequent patents with an issue year beyond 1999, which are not included in Hall et al. (2001).   27
patentability of an application, it also depends on the characteristics of the US examiner who 
did the examination. It is well known that there exists significant heterogeneity in many 
aspects across US examiners. Indeed Cockburn et al. (2004) state that “there may be as many 
patent offices as there are patent examiners.” To control for the potential heterogeneity in 
search effort across US examiners, we collect the information about the names of primary 
examiners and assistant examiners (if any) for each of the US patents in the sample. An 
ANOVA test confirms that the variable SMPP differs systematically for patents examined by 
different primary examiners. To control for the heterogeneous search effort across primary 
examiners, we use a US examiner fixed effect for each primary examiner, which allows us to 
use variations in SMPPs within patents examined by the same US examiner to identify the 
effect of SMPP.
74 The intuition is that if a patent’s SMPP is higher relative to the other 
patents examined by the same examiner, then the examiner might have thought this patent is 
more patentable and made less of a search effort. We also use a dummy variable for whether a 
US patent has an assistant examiner to control for the potential difference between US patents 
that are examined by both a primary examiner and an assistant examiner, and those examined 
by a primary examiner alone 
 A patent’s SMPP also depends on its technology field. Figure 4 plots the average 
SMPP and EPO grant rate for each of the 30 technologies, with the average SMPPs in an 
ascending order. We can see that the average SMPP differs from one technology to another. 
But there is no clear correlation between the average SMPPs and the EPO grant rates. US 
patents in medical engineering have the highest average SMPP and patents in biotechnology 
the lowest, but the EPO grant rates for patents in medical engineering and biotechnology are 
about the same and rank in the middle among these 30 technologies. To control for the 
heterogeneity in SMPP across technology fields, dummy variables for each of the 30 
technologies are used. We also use dummy variables for different USPTO application years to 
control for unobserved time-varying factors at the USPTO that may impact SMPP.   
 
                                                        
74  We focus on primary examiners in our empirical specifications, as an assistant examiner does not have 
signatory authority in issuing patents. 50.1% of the patents in the sample does not have an assistant 
examiner.    28
We use two empirical strategies in the paper. In the first strategy, we include US 
patents whose examiners have at least 10 patents in our sample
75 and run the following 
unbalanced panel data model with examiner fixed effects:   
 
( A )             11 ** ieft i i e f t ieft YS M P P X αβ γ δ ημ =+ + + + +        
 
Where Yieft is the EPO application outcome for a US patent i that is examined by a US 
examiner e, in technology field f and with a USPTO application year t; SMPPi is the share of 
missed prior patents for the patent i; Xi’s are control variables for the patent i that influence its 
EPO application outcome, described in Section 4.6; γe is the examiner fixed effect; and δf and 
ηt are dummies for the 30 technology fields and six USPTO application years, respectively.   
  In the second strategy, we use examiner by technology by year fixed effects to control 
for unobserved time-varying factors whose impacts may differ across different examiners 
and/or different technology fields. Over the course of six years (1990-1995) some US 
examiners might gain more experience than other examiners, and some technology fields 
might evolve more dramatically than other field.
76 To control for these unobserved 
examiner-specific and technology-specific factors that vary over time, we include US patents 
whose examiners have at least 4 patents in the sample that are in the same technology field 
and with a same USPTO application year, and run an unbalanced panel data model with 
examiner by technology by year fixed effects,θeft: 
 
( B )                22 ** ieft i i eft ieft YS M P P X α βθ ν =+ + +  
 
Essentially, we identify the effect of SMPP on EPO application outcomes using 
variations in SMPPs within US patents that are examined by the same examiner e, in the same 
technology field f and filed at the USPTO in the same year t. Since in each year a US 
                                                        
75  We also try different cut-off points and use US patents whose examiners have at least 5, 15 and 20 
patents in the sample, respectively. The results remain similar.   
76  For instance, in early 1990s nanotechnology was a very new field and US examiners did not know much 
about it and thus cited little prior art. In time, examiners gained more knowledge about this technology and 
the amount of cited prior art increased gradually.     29
examiner might not have multiple patents in our sample that are in the same technology field, 
the second strategy significantly reduces the size of the analytic sample, leading to larger 
standard errors for the estimated coefficients. It is a more robust and convincing strategy and 
a nice complement to the first empirical strategy.   
For both strategies, a linear probability model is used when the dependent variable is 
binary, which is the case for most of the regressions in the study (e.g., applicants’ decisions 
not to withdraw at the EPO, the EPO’s decisions to grant or reject, and so on). 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the whole sample. Panel B shows 
the summary for the analytic sample used in the first empirical strategy (A) that involves 
examiner fixed effects. Panel C reveals the summary statistics for the analytic sample in the 
second empirical strategy (B) using examiner by technology by year fixed effects. There is no 
systematic difference across the three panels. 
 
5.2 EPO application outcomes 
The regression results confirm the message revealed graphically in Figure 5. Table 4 
and 5 show the regression results regarding the EPO application outcomes. The empirical 
strategy in Table 4 involves an unbalanced panel data model with  examiner fixed effects, 
and the strategy in Table 5 implements an unbalanced panel data with examiner by technology 
by year fixed effects. Various specifications are tested in both strategies.   
Panel A of Table 4 studies the probability of non-withdrawal at the EPO, with the 
dependent variable being 1 if not being withdrawn and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients 
for the share of missed prior patents (SMPP) are all significantly positive at the 1% level. An 
application related to a US patent with a higher SMPP is more likely not to be withdrawn at 
the EPO.   
The result is consistent with the hypothesis that US examiners distinguish good 
applications from bad ones and put more effort in search for prior art for those deemed as less 
patentable. Examiners are not “rationally ignorant” of applications’ patentability. 
 The coefficients for the variable LLPP (logarithm of the number of linguistically 
linked prior patents), a possible indicator for difficulty of finding relevant priors, are not 
significant. Neither are the coefficients for whether a US patent had an assistant examiner. A   30
US patent in a later technology stage, measured by the variable Innovation stage, is more 
likely to be withdrawn at the EPO. If a US patent has more assignees, it is less likely to be 
withdrawn at the EPO, possibly because having more assignees implies a higher commercial 
value, or it is harder for multiple assignees to agree on withdrawal.   
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results for the EPO’s decision to grant or reject an 
application, conditional on that the applicant persists at the EPO and does not withdraw it. 
The dependent variable is 1 if the EPO grants and 0 if rejects. Across various specifications 
the estimated coefficients for SMPP are all significantly positive, suggesting that a US patent 
with a higher SMPP has more probability of being granted by the EPO. Note that this subset 
of US patents has already survived a first round of filtering by applicants’ decisions of 
whether to withdraw and thus, on average, have higher SMPPs than those withdrawn. Still, 
the variable SMPP has a significantly positive correlation with the EPO’s decision to grant. 
For control variables, if a US patent has a higher number of total subsequent patents, an 
indicator of the patent’s importance or value, it is more likely to be granted by the EPO, 
conditional on a non-withdrawal. This result further confirms our main hypothesis that a US 
examiner’s search effort is dependent on his perception of the patentability of an application 
and his perception is quite consistent with that of his EPO counterparts.   
In Panel C of Table 4, we group together those US patents whose corresponding EPO 
applications were either withdrawn by applicants or rejected by the EPO as the failure group, 
as opposed to the success group composed of the US patents that were granted. The variable, 
SMPP, exhibits a significantly positive effect on the probability of being successful at the 
EPO. An increase in SMPP by 0.5 (roughly from the 25th percentile to the 75
th percentile in 
SMPPs for the US patents in the sample) will increase the EPO success rate by about 5 
percentage points. Given the EPO success rate for the analytical sample is around 65% and 
the variable SMPP is constructed using M-CAM uncited prior patents, probably a very noisy 
proxy for US examiner’s search effort, this is a strong result. 
The number of assignees is positively correlated with the likelihood of success at the 
EPO. A US patent that is in a later stage of its technology trajectory, indicated by a larger 
Innovation stage, is more likely to fail at the EPO. If the total prior patents of a US patent are 
more dispersed in different technologies (covering more US classifications), it is less likely   31
for the patent to be successful at the EPO. 
  The regressions in Table 5 involve examiner by technology by year fixed. The results 
in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 4, but the standard errors of the estimates are larger, as 
the size of the analytic sample is smaller. These results further confirm that US examiners can, 
by and large, make a good assessment of the patentability of an application, and conduct their 
searches for prior art accordingly. 
 
5.2  Applicants’ request for examination after EPO search report 
To confirm our findings, we investigate an applicant’s decision on whether to request 
an examination after she receives an EPO search report. As described in Section 4.2, an EPO 
search report cites relevant prior art that an EPO searcher identifies for an EPO application, 
and it is the first important information about the patentability that the applicant learns about 
from the EPO. Within 6 months after receiving the EPO search report, the applicant must 
decide whether to request an examination. In our sample, 94% did so with an average lag 
between requesting and receiving search reports being 4.3 months. For the remaining 6%, 
their applications were deemed as withdrawn.   
Table 6 shows the results. Panel A in Table 6 implements an examiner fixed effect 
model and Panel B an examiner by technology by year fixed effect model. The results from 
these two strategies are similar. Perhaps due to a smaller sample size, some coefficients in 
Panel B are less significant than their counterparts in Panel A, though the magnitudes are 
close. Columns 1 and 3 show that the variable, SMPP, has significant explanatory power in 
the likelihood of requesting an examination at the EPO after the applicant receives the EPO 
search report. Furthermore, if an applicant is to request an examination, she does so sooner if 
the US patent has a higher SMPP, as shown in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 6. If a US patent has 
a higher number of US classifications, a possible indicator of the complexity of the invention, 
the applicant takes a longer time to request an examination in the EPO. A higher number of 
assignees leads to a faster request, suggesting that the variable is more of an indicator of 
commercial value than of the difficulty of reaching consensus.     
 
5.3  Testing alternative rationales   32
Thus far, the results have shown that for a US patent with a higher share of missed 
prior patents (SMPP), its corresponding EPO application is more likely not to be withdrawn 
and, conditional on non-withdrawal, more likely to be granted by the EPO. Our interpretation 
is that when an invention is more patentable (more novel and non-obvious), the US examiner 
would make less of an effort in searching for prior art and the resulting US patent would have 
a higher SMPP. Since the invention is more patentable, it will more likely succeed at the EPO. 
Therefore, the variable SMPP, reflecting the patentability (strength) of an invention, has 
significant explanatory power regarding the EPO application outcome.   
In this subsection, we also address several alternative explanations for the finding that 
a US patent with a higher SMPP is more likely to succeed at the EPO. We argue that these 
alternative stories are implausible. 
 
Alternative story 1: information flow 
The first alternative explanation tells a story of information flow from the USPTO to 
the EPO. Suppose that during their search for prior art, EPO searchers rely heavily on what 
US examiners have found. For instance, in a extremely hypothetical case then EPO searcher 
just copies the prior art that are cited by US examiners in issued US patents. In this case, a 
higher SMPP, caused by whatever reasons at the USPTO, may be transferred to the EPO. As a 
result, the EPO examiner would miss a higher portion of prior art when doing their 
examination, and therefore, be more likely to grant a patent. In this story, the variable SMPP 
has nothing to do with US examiner’s search effort.   
To test this explanation, we look at a subset of US patents, for which EPO search 
reports had been published before the US patents were issued. This subsample covers for 
41.5% of the US patents in our sample. For them, it was impossible for EPO searchers to 
know what prior art US examiners would cite. Table 7 shows the results, for both an examiner 
fixed effect model and an examiner by technology by year fixed effect model. The findings 
still hold that a US patent with a higher SMPP is more likely not to be withdrawn and more 
likely to succeed at the EPO. Therefore, the story of information flow from the USPTO to the 
EPO is unpersuasive. 
   33
Alternative story 2: difficulty of finding prior art 
The second alternative explanation is that it might be inherently more difficult for 
some inventions to find prior art, even after we control for technology fields, the number of 
total prior art, and the number of linguistically linked prior art (LLPP). If this is the case, the 
variable SMPP might just pick up the effect of such difficulty of finding prior art. An 
invention for which it is more difficult to find its prior art might have a higher SMPP at the 
USPTO and, when it goes to the EPO, the EPO searcher might miss a larger portion of its 
prior art, causing the EPO examiner to be more likely to grant. 
In Table 8, we show that a US patent with a higher SMPP actually had a shorter search 
interval in the EPO search office. This contradicts the story that it is the difficulty of finding 
prior art that causes a higher SMPP. The result seems to suggest that EPO searchers have the 
same search strategy as US examiners: for a more novel/non-obvious invention, they tend to 
search less, resulting in a shorter search interval.   
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 8 investigate the relationship between SMPP and the EPO 
search interval, measured by the time between the EPO filing date and the publication date of 
the search report.
77 The coefficients for SMPP are significantly negative. The number of 
linguistically linked prior patents (LLPP) is positively correlated with the EPO search length, 
suggesting that, all things equal, it takes EPO searchers more time to go through a larger pool 
of potential prior patents to figure out which are the relevant prior art. If a US patent has more 
claims, its EPO application may have more claims as well; and that leads to a longer EPO 
search time. A US patent in a later technology stage, indicated by a longer Lag to total prior 
patents, has a shorter EPO search process, possibly because EPO searchers are more familiar 
with the technology field and thus the search process is easier and shorter. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 8 investigate the average search time spent on each piece of 
prior art cited in the search report.
78  The variable SMPP is also negatively correlated with the 
search interval per citation, further suggesting that a higher SMPP is not caused by the 
inherent difficulty of finding prior art. 
                                                        
77  The average EPO search interval is 1.05 years. 
78  The Jensen et al. (2006) dataset contains a field about the amount of cited prior art in EPO search reports. 
We construct a variable, search interval per cited prior art, by dividing the total search time by the number 
of references cited in the search report. The average search interval per cited prior art is 0.36 years.     34
 
Alternative story 3: a novel invention has fewer prior art 
The third alternative explanation is based on a widely accepted notion that a more 
original (novel and non-obvious) invention tends to have less prior art. Suppose that the US 
examiner actually obtained all relevant prior art and there is no so-called “missed prior art” at 
all and that, for each US patent in the sample, what the M-CAM linguistic/semantic matching 
algorithm gives us, is roughly a similar number of prior patents that only bear some linguistic 
similarity to the root patent. In this case, we would have artificially constructed a higher 
SMPP for a more novel/non-obvious US patent, even though there are no “missed prior 
patents”.  
We don’t think this story as plausible, on two grounds. First, the histogram in Figure 3 
shows that the number of missed prior patents has a significant degree of dispersion and is not 
concentrated in a narrow range. Secondly, we test whether the number of missed prior patents 
is correlated with EPO application outcomes, particularly when the number of cited prior 
patents is controlled for. According to this third alternative explanation, missed prior patents 
should bear no information about the invention’s patentability. Part (a) of Table 9 shows the 
effects of the number of cited prior patents and the number of missed prior patents on EPO 
application outcomes, with an examiner fixed effect model. The number of missed prior 
patents is significantly and positively correlated with the probability of an EPO success, both 
when excluding and including the number of cited prior patents in the regressions. Thus, the 
number of missed prior patents does contain significant information about the patentability, 
rendering the alternative story implausible.   
The number of cited prior patents is negatively correlated with the likelihood of an 
EPO success. When a US examiner puts more effort in search for prior art for an application 
deemed as less patentable, he obtains and cites more prior art. Interestingly, the effects for the 
number of missed prior patents and the number of cited prior patents are both greater when 
the two variables are both included in the regressions, suggesting that the ratio, the share of 
missed prior patents (SMPP), is a better measure of the US examiner’s search effort than 
either the number of missed prior patents or the number of missed prior patents alone. 
Part (b) of Table 9 involves a examiner by technology by year fixed effect model. The   35
results are similar in magnitude to those in Part (a). Some coefficients become less significant 
because of larger standard errors, possibly due to a smaller sample size. 
 
After testing these alternative explanations, we further verify the hypothesis that a 
higher SMPP is caused by less effort in search for prior art by the US examiner, who makes 
such a decision according to the patentability of the application. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We also did three robustness checks, two involving specifications that employ 
different fixed effects in the panel data model and another testing the outcomes of the related 
JPO applications. All these robustness checks further verify the result that a US patent with a 
higher SMPP is a stronger patent. 
 
US examiner by patent assignee fixed effect model 
 We also implement a US examiner by patent assignee fixed effect model. A US 
examiner by patent assignee fixed effect allows us to look at US patents that are filed by the 
same US firm and examined by the same US examiner and control for unobserved 
heterogeneities in application strategies by different applicants (large firms versus small firms) 
and/or heterogeneity in examiners’ responses to different applicants: 
 
( C )              33 ** ieaft i i ea f t ieaft YS M P P X α βγ δ η ν =+ + + + +  
 
Yieaft is the EPO application outcome for a US patent i that is assigned to an assignee a, 
examined by a US examiner e, in technology field f and with a USPTO application year t; γea 
is the US examiner by patent assignee fixed effect; δf and ηt are dummies controlling for 
technology fields and USPTO application years, respectively.   
Table 10 shows the results of various specifications, all using a US examiner by US 
assignee fixed effect model. The sample size is much smaller because many pairs of US 
examiner-assignee do not have multiple patents in our sample. In all the specifications, the   36
coefficients for the share of missed prior patent, SMPP, are all significantly positive with 
regard to the probabilities of not being withdrawn, of being granted conditional on 
non-withdrawal, and of being successful at the EPO.   
 
Primary examiner by secondary examiner fixed effects 
So far, we have treated patents with the same primary examiner to have the same 
examiner fixed effect and only used a dummy variable to control for whether there is a 
secondary examiner. Our reasoning is that it is primary examiners who supervise secondary 
examiners, make decisions and sign off grant or rejection decisions. But one might argue that 
since it is secondary examiners who do actual work, there might be fundamental difference 
among, for instance, a patent with a primary examiner only, a patent with the same primary 
examiner and a secondary examiner, and a patent with the same primary examiner and 
another secondary examiner.   
Table 11 investigates whether using primary by secondary examiners fixed effects 
change the results. In Part (a) of Table 11, we assign a different examiner ID to each of the 
standing-alone primary examiners and primary-secondary examiner pairs, and then apply 
either examiner fixed effects (Panel A of Table 11) or examiner by technology by year fixed 
effects (Panel B of Table 11) in the analysis. In Part (b) we look at the subset of patents that 
have both a primary and secondary examiners, assign a different examiner ID to each pair of 
primary-secondary examiners, and then apply either examiner fixed effects (Panel A ) or 
examiner by technology by year fixed effects (Panel B) in the analysis. Table 11 shows that in 
all these specifications, the results still holds that SMPP significantly predict the probability of 
non-withdrawal and the probability of being successful at the EPO.   
 
Outcomes of related JPO applications 
 The applicants in our sample also filed related applications at the JPO, within one 
year after they filed with the USPTO. Unlike filings at the USPTO or at the EPO, where an 
examination (at the USPTO) or a search for prior art (at the EPO) automatically ensue, filing 
at the JPO does not trigger any action by the JPO. An applicant can wait up to seven years to 
request an examination, until which point the JPO takes no action at all. Therefore, an   37
applicant’s decision on whether to submit a request with the JPO, and subsequent decisions on 
whether to withdraw might be, to a large extent, related to what happened in the USPTO and 
in the EPO.
79 
In this paper, we run a preliminary reduced form regression to test whether the share 
of missed prior patents, SMPP, predicts JPO application outcomes.
80 Table 12 shows the 
results, both for an examiner fixed effect model and an examiner by technology by year fixed 
effect model. The coefficients for SMPP are significantly positive in an applicant’s decision 
whether to withdraw at the JPO, though smaller than the coefficients of SMPP in his decision 
on whether to withdraw at the EPO. This result has two implications. First, it further confirms 
our main hypothesis that a patent with a higher SMPP is indeed a stronger patent. Second, it 
seems that, due to various institutional and cultural reasons,
81  the JPO application outcome is 
a noisier indicator of an invention’s patentability than the EPO application outcome.
82 The 
coefficients for SMPP are not significant in the JPO’s decision to grant, conditional on the 
application not being withdrawn, though still positive. Not surprisingly, the variable SMPP is 
significant in predicting whether a US patent is successful (granted) or failed (rejected or 
withdrawn) at the JPO. 
 
6.  Policy Implications and Conclusion 
In the vast economic literature regarding patents, little has been written about the 
implication of the behavior of examiners and applicants during patent examination. The 
process of patent examination has been treated as a “black box,” out of which patent 
applications are either granted or rejected. This paper shows that the patent examination 
process reveals much richer information than a decision of approval or rejection. We study the 
                                                        
79  The interaction of patent examinations at the triadic patent offices, and its implications for international 
patenting, are separate issues which we shall study in a separate but related paper. 
80  For the US patens in the sample, 31.1% were withdrawn, 38.9% granted, 16.7% rejected, and 13.2% 
pending at the JPO. 
81  For example, a US patent application has to be translated to Japanese in order to file at the JPO. Also, 
prior to 1988, only one independent claim was allowed in a Japanese patent. That rule was changed in 1988 
（Sakakikibara and Branstetter (2001). However, Japanese patents, on average, still have fewer 
independent claims than US and European patents. In 2003, the average number of claims in a Japanese 
patent was 7, whereas it was 23 for the USPTO and 18 for the EPO. 
82  A simulation shows that in the case of a limited dependent variable, random measurement error in the 
dependent variable will cause estimated coefficients to be attenuated. To see this, suppose JPO application 
outcomes are totally random, the coefficient of SMPP would be zero.   38
effort by US examiners in their searches for prior art. We find that examiners are not 
“rationally ignorant” of the patentability of patent applications. Examiners can, on average, 
identify which applications are stronger in two senses: they are more likely to receive a 
related patent in the Europe; and their US patents are more likely to be renewed by patentees 
in the USPTO eight year after issuance. For applications that seem weaker, examiners put 
more effort in search for prior art because they bear the burden of proof of non-patentability. 
  Our study provides a piece of empirical evidence that the problem of weak patents in 
the US might be broad and systematic, which, in spite of many anecdotes, has not been 
empirically tested.
83  Due to lack of compelling quantitative evidence, defenders of the current 
patent system assert that whatever transition problems the USPTO may have had in such new 
areas as software and business methods, weak patents will be adequately addressed as the 
USPTO gains experience and skill in these areas.
84 This study challenges this assertion. Our 
sample contains all the US patents that were originated from the US (by US inventors) with a 
USPTO application year between 1990 and 1995 and also applied with the EPO through 
Non-PCT filings. Among them, almost 35% of their corresponding EPO applications are 
either withdrawn or rejected. The result that US examiners’ search effort has significant 
effects on EPO application outcomes suggests that if these US examiners worked at the EPO 
they would also likely reject these applications. They were granted at the USPTO, possibly 
because US examiners’ hands were “tied up” by pro-“customer” rules and procedures. The 
fact that these applications went through the USPTO but failed at the EPO seems to suggest 
that the USPTO issues weaker patents. 
 Furthermore, our study suggests that, in regard to the causes of weak patents in the 
US, pro-“customer” rules and policies, such as the institutional, procedural and cultural 
incentives at the USPTO that favor issuing patents, might be more salient than the alleged 
“rational ignorance” of US examiners. Our results show that US examiners can, in general, 
                                                        
83  The NAS Study (2004) studies the trend in patent strength using three measures: (1) the ratio of invalid 
to valid patent determinations in infringement law suits; (2) the error rate in USPTO quality assessment 
review of allowed patent applications; and (3) the rate of claim cancellation or outright patent revocation in 
reexamination proceedings at the USPTO. These indicators show mixed results. Also, note that measures (1) 
and (3) are plagued by selection bias. 
84  See, e.g. Edward G. Fiorito, Chair’s Bulletin, 2001 A.B.A. Sec. Intellectual Prop. L. Rep. 5, 
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/chair/apr01chair.html.   39
distinguish “good” applications from “bad” ones and search harder for those deemed as less 
patentable. But there might be too many barriers and disincentives for them to make full use 
of their knowledge of applications’ patentability.   
What could be done to address the problem of weak patents? Among proposed 
measures to improve patent quality, one of the most widely proposed remedies, and also the 
most intuitively obvious one, is to devote more resources to the USPTO to hire more 
examiners, provide more technical training for examiners, offer higher salaries to retain senior 
and experienced examiners, and allocate more time for each application.
85  On the other hand, 
Lemley (2001) suggests that “spending more time and money weeding out bad patents and 
strengthening the examination process is not cost effective.” Our study suggests that a tradeoff 
between weeding out weak patents and increasing USPTO expenditure does not necessarily 
exist at the margin. US examiners, with resource currently available to them, are not 
“rationally ignorant” of applications’ patentability. It seems that, even keeping unchanged the 
number of examiners, the workload, and the time allocated for each application, the strength 
of issued patents might be significantly improved by empowering examiners to be able to 
reject applications that they consider as unpatentable. Measures such as limiting the number 
of continuations an applicant can file and raising the patentability bar, particularly for 
non-obviousness, might be effective without incurring much further expenditure at the 
USPTO.  
Finally, our study suggests an alternative view about cited prior art, particularly its 
implication for patent validity (strength). Scholars have suggested that citing more prior art 
makes a patent stronger and more likely to stand a validity challenge, because the 
examination seems to be more thorough and thus it is less likely that prior art exists that will 
be discovered later and used to invalidate the patent. This argument assumes a 
non-informative prior art search. Our study, however, indicates examiners, bearing the burden 
of proof, put more search effort to obtain more and better evidence and to deter applicants 
from persisting. A higher amount of cited prior art might reflect examiners’ assessment of lack 
of patentability of an application.   
                                                        
85  See NAS Study (2004), FTC Report (2003), and USPTO “The 21
st Century Strategic Plan” (Feb, 2003).   40
Our results in Table 8, consistent with some previous empirical studies,
86 show that 
for the US patents in our sample, a higher number of cited prior patents are positively 
correlated with the failure at the EPO. A higher amount of cited prior art indicates the 
weakness of a patent, rather than the survival of a more rigorous examination, partly because 
issuing a US patent itself does not tell us much about its strength, as the applicant can always 
persist until the US examiner concedes.   
This paper is just our first attempt to look inside the “black box” of patent examination. 
Future research will use information about office actions by US examiners during 
examinations, from the USPTO’s Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system, to 
investigate whether those weak applications were indeed initially rejected but eventually 
granted by US examiners. Our study opens an interesting research line that studies the 
behavior of both applicants and examiners, using detailed information about the dynamic 
progress of the examination processes at multiple patent offices.   
 
                                                        
86  See Allison et al. (2004) on the positive relationship between cited prior art and litigation; Allison and 
Tiller (2003) on the difference in cited prior art between Internet business method patents, for which the 
weak patent problem is believed to be much more widespread, and the general patents; and Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2004) on the positive correlation between cited prior art and opposition at the EPO.   41
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Figure 3: Distributions of cited prior patents and missed prior patents 
 
Panel A: Histogram of the number of cited prior patents 
 
 
Panel B: Histogram of the number of M-CAM missed prior patents 
 
Note: The distributions of both the number of cited prior patents and the number of M-CAM missed prior patents are 
concentrated in the range of 1-50 and show significant levels of dispersion, suggesting that the M-CAM algorithm has certain 
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Figure 4: Comparison of average SMPP and EPO grant rates across technology fields 
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Note: The average share of missed prior patents (SMPP) and the EPO grant rates vary across technology fields. The black 
bars show the average SMPP across technology fields, in an ascending order. The white bars show the EPO grant rates.   47
Figure 5: Differences in average SMPP for US patents with different EPO application 
outcomes 
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Note: Differences in average share of missed prior patents (SMPP) for US patents with different EPO application outcomes: 
(1) not withdrawn versus withdrawn, (2) granted versus rejected, and (3) success (granted) versus failure (rejected and 
withdrawn), respectively. Panel A shows differences in average SMPP for each of the 30 technology fields and Panel B for 
each of the 6 USPTO application years. A solid symbol indicates a significant difference and a hollow symbol not significant, 
at 5% level.  48
 
Table 1: EPO application outcomes 
 
# of Obs Percentage of Obs with different EPO Application Outcomes
withdrawn rejected granted pending
(1) All inventions
22,317 28.32 5.57 60.24 5.87
(2) Inventions in different technology fields (OST)
1 electrical devices 1,659 28.63 6.63 60.88 3.86
2 audiovisual tech 587 32.88 7.67 54.00 5.45
3 telecommunications 2,703 31.08 4.40 53.98 10.54
4 info tech 2,374 34.50 3.96 51.35 10.19
5 semiconductors 718 40.67 7.10 44.01 8.22
6 optics 1,961 23.05 4.95 66.50 5.51
7 analysis/measurement 1,556 29.88 5.33 58.29 6.49
8 medical engr 844 29.27 5.33 59.83 5.57
9 organic fine chem 806 24.07 7.94 64.27 3.72
10 macromolecular polyme 1,013 25.07 5.53 63.38 6.02
11 pharmaceuticals 463 36.50 11.02 45.36 7.13
12 biotech 171 28.07 4.68 61.40 5.85
13 materials metallurgy 401 29.18 7.98 58.60 4.24
14 agriculture food 74 21.62 5.41 71.62 1.35
15 general processes 747 27.31 6.69 62.38 3.61
16 surfaces coatings 754 30.11 5.84 60.48 3.58
17 material processing 467 22.48 5.57 68.31 3.64
18 thermal techniques 250 20.40 4.40 70.80 4.40
19 basic chem proc petro 337 26.11 5.64 64.09 4.15
20 environment pollution 125 31.20 6.40 60.80 1.60
21 mechanical tool 446 26.91 6.05 65.92 1.12
22 engines pump turbine 520 23.85 3.65 68.85 3.65
23 mechanical element 663 22.17 5.58 70.44 1.81
24 handling printing 1,125 17.96 4.00 75.64 2.40
25 agriculture food mach 45 31.11 11.11 53.33 4.44
26 transport 469 20.90 4.69 72.71 1.71
27 nuclear engineering 268 35.45 5.60 55.22 3.73
28 space tech weapons 90 22.22 1.11 71.11 5.56
29 consumer goods equip 427 32.08 8.90 54.10 4.92
30 civil engr bldg minin 125 30.40 6.40 59.20 4.00
99 misc unclassfied 113 23.01 5.31 67.26 4.42
(3) Inventions applied at USPTO in different years
1990 4,704 29.91 7.27 59.48 3.34
1991 4,039 29.39 5.57 62.54 2.5
1992 3,902 26.76 5.18 65.53 2.54
1993 3,361 26.45 5.83 63.05 4.67
1994 3,253 28.71 4.89 57.58 8.82
1995 3,042 28.11 3.81 51.45 16.63  
 
Note: Percentages of US patents that were withdrawn, rejected, granted and pending at the EPO, respectively. Part (1) shows 
the statistics is for the whole sample, Part (2) for each of the 30 technology fields, and Part (3) for each of the 6 USPTO 
application years.  49
 


















patent is included 
in MPP? 
WARF Stem cell patent  5843780  5166065  Y  Y 
Pfizer Lipitor patent  5969156  5273995  Y  N 
Forgent JPEG    4698672  4541012  Y  Y 
EpicRealm Website  5894554  5701451  Y  Y 
Monsanto   5352605  4407956  Y  N 
Patriot Scientific 
Microprocessor 
5809336 4691124  N  N 
 
Note: Patents that are revoked by the USPTO due to patentability challenges from PubPat, and the invalidating prior patents 
that are used by the PubPat in these challenges. In three out of six cases, the invalidating prior patents are included in 
“M-CAM missed prior patents” (MPP), and in five out of six, the invalidating prior patents are included in “M-CAM 
linguistically linked prior patents” (LLPP).   50
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
　 Panel A: The whole sample Panel B: Analytic sample 1 Panel C: Analytic sample 2
in Examiner fixed effects model in Examiner-tech-year fixed effects model
(examiner patent counts >=10) (examiner-tech-year patent counts >=4)
Variables Sample size Mean Std. Dev. Sample size Mean Std. Dev. Sample size Mean Std. Dev.
SMPP 21823 0.315 0.249 18602 0.317 0.249 13291 0.319 0.249
# of cited prior patents 22300 7.709 7.260 18996 7.624 7.139 13548 7.623 6.971
# of missed prior patents 22300 5.692 9.111 18996 5.677 8.957 13548 5.802 9.183
# of  total prior patents (cited and missed) 22300 13.400 14.270 18996 13.301 14.015 13548 13.425 14.073
secondexaminer_dummy 22300 0.498 0.500 18996 0.548 0.498 13548 0.577 0.494
# of linguistically linked prior patents (log) 22253 4.327 0.891 18969 4.339 0.885 13532 4.363 0.874
# of claims 21810 15.941 10.773 18786 15.957 10.833 13417 15.904 10.531
# of classifications 22300 3.957 2.711 18996 3.888 2.593 13548 3.796 2.526
# of inventors 22300 2.243 1.396 18996 2.239 1.393 13548 2.263 1.422
# of assignees 22300 0.990 0.179 18996 0.991 0.175 13548 0.993 0.164
# of total subsequent patents (citing and unciting) 22300 31.066 51.218 18996 31.558 51.560 13548 33.730 54.068
# of citing subsequent patents 22300 15.150 20.543 18996 15.597 21.060 13548 16.647 22.073
Innovation stage (total priors/total subsequents) 22199 0.351 0.242 18923 0.348 0.241 13499 0.339 0.237
Innovation stage (cited priors/citing subsequents) 22196 0.397 0.262 18922 0.392 0.260 13498 0.383 0.256
Lag to total prior patents 21823 7.182 2.819 18602 7.023 2.737 13291 6.820 2.665
Lag to cited prior patents  21745 6.479 2.985 18538 6.338 2.906 13249 6.130 2.814
Lag of total subsequent patents  21215 4.880 1.595 18116 4.956 1.536 12979 4.950 1.507
Lag of citing subsequent patents  21108 5.411 1.446 18024 5.423 1.443 12915 5.387 1.420
# of primary classes in total prior patents 22300 3.342 2.370 18996 3.318 2.344 13548 3.235 2.279
# of primary classes in cited prior patents 22300 2.719 1.895 18996 2.695 1.873 13548 2.634 1.826
# of primary classes in total subsequent patents  22300 4.400 3.721 18996 4.427 3.742 13548 4.464 3.724
# of primary classes in citing subsequent patents  22300 3.405 2.676 18996 3.441 2.698 13548 3.488 2.706  
Note: Summary statistics for the full sample and the two analytical samples. The first analytical sample, used in the US examiner fixed effect model, consists of US patents whose examiner has at least 
10 patents (examiner patent counts >=10);    the second analytical sample, used in the US examiner by technology by year fixed effect model, consists of US patents whose examiner has at least 4 
patents that are in the same technology and with the same USPTO application year (examiner-tech-year patent counts >=4).  51
Table 4: EPO application outcomes, using an examiner fixed effect model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Not Withdrawn Panel B: Granted,  Panel C: Success at EPO
(given nonwithdrawal)
SMPP 0.1003 0.0997 0.0819 0.0454 0.0395 0.0308 0.1259 0.1220 0.0974
(0.0171)*** (0.0178)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0135)*** (0.0143)** (0.0182)*** (0.0195)*** (0.0204)***
Have assistant examiner 0.0045 0.0054 0.0057 0.0090 0.0097 0.0134 0.0062 0.0072 0.0090
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0141)
# of LLPP (log) -0.0011 0.0044 0.0024 -0.0030 -0.0051 -0.0024 -0.0017 0.0024 0.0021
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0072)
# of claims 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)* (0.0003)* (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
# of classifications -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0007
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
# of inventors 0.0010 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0011
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030)
# of assignees 0.0684 0.0705 0.0730 0.0226 0.0233 0.0261 0.0766 0.0786 0.0823
(0.0208)*** (0.0210)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0240)*** (0.0241)*** (0.0244)***
# of total prior patents -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0003
(0.0004)*** (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)*** (0.0005)
# of total subseq patents 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)
Innovation stage -0.0634 -0.0166 -0.0709
(0.0243)*** (0.0180) (0.0276)**
Lag to total prior patents -0.0011 0.0007 0.0000
(0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0017)
Lag of total subseq patents 0.0021 0.0015 0.0031
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0028)
# of primary classes in  -0.0039 -0.0017 -0.0055
   total prior patents (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0026)**
# of primary classes in  0.0014 -0.0018 0.0004
   total subseq patents (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0019)
Observations 18320 18320 17525 12162 12162 11664 17329 17329 16568  
 
Note: Standard errors clustered by US examiner in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Different specifications are tested, all of which involve an examiner 
fixed effect. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application is not withdrawn and 0 if withdrawn by the applicant. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application is 
granted and 0 if rejected, conditional on it is not withdrawn. In column 7-9, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application succeeds (granted) at the EPO and 0 if failed (either withdrawn or rejected). 
Dummies for each of the 30 technology fields and for each of the 6 USPTO application years are included in all the specifications.   52
Table 5: EPO application outcomes, using an examiner by technology by year fixed effect model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Not Withdrawn Panel B: Granted,  Panel C: Success at EPO
(given nonwithdrawal)
SMPP 0.0893 0.0902 0.0723 0.0536 0.0464 0.0381 0.1203 0.1192 0.0958
(0.0221)*** (0.0232)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0178)*** (0.0190)** (0.0201)* (0.0243)*** (0.0258)*** (0.0278)***
Have assistant examiner 0.0171 0.0179 0.0184 -0.0025 -0.0015 0.0011 0.0126 0.0140 0.0149
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0218)
# of LLPP (log) -0.0030 0.0042 0.0014 -0.0078 -0.0103 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0016 -0.0031
(0.0069) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0090) (0.0100)
# of claims 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)* (0.0004)** (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
# of classifications 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026)
# of inventors -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038)
# of assignees 0.0711 0.0745 0.0850 0.0270 0.0279 0.0339 0.0801 0.0837 0.0955
(0.0289)** (0.0290)** (0.0290)*** (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0270) (0.0329)** (0.0331)** (0.0333)***
# of total prior patents -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0005
(0.0005)*** (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)*** (0.0006)
# of total subseq patents 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)
Innovation stage -0.0868 -0.0093 -0.0785
(0.0312)*** (0.0247) (0.0348)**
Lag to total prior patents -0.0009 0.0014 0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0024)
Lag of total subseq patents 0.0050 0.0024 0.0067
(0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0038)*
# of primary classes in  -0.0074 -0.0004 -0.0087
   total prior patents (0.0030)** (0.0025) (0.0034)***
# of primary classes in  0.0025 -0.0023 0.0018
   total subseq patents (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0024)
Observations 13096 13096 12581 8639 8639 8308 12327 12327 11836  
 
Note: Standard errors clustered by examiner x technology x year in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Different specifications are tested, all of which involve 
a US examiner by technology by year fixed effect. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application is not withdrawn and 0 if withdrawn by the applicant. In columns 4-6, the dependent 
variable is 1 if an EPO application is granted and 0 if rejected, conditional on it is not withdrawn. In column 7-9, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application succeeds (granted) at the EPO and 0 if 
failed (either withdrawn or rejected).   53
Table 6: Request for examination after search report at EPO 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Examiner fixed effect Panel B: Examiner by tech by year fixed effect
Whether to  Lag of request (years) Whether to  Lag of request (years)
request exam (for those that requested exams) request exam (for those that requested exams)
SMPP 0.0252 -0.0376 0.0234 -0.0385
(0.0104)** (0.0168)** (0.0145) (0.0207)*
Have assistant examiner 0.0091 -0.0137 0.0129 -0.0196
(0.0076) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0173)
# of LLPP (log) 0.0026 0.0068 0.0030 0.0034
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0067)
# of claims 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
# of classifications -0.0000 0.0027 -0.0000 0.0035
(0.0010) (0.0014)** (0.0012) (0.0021)*
# of inventors 0.0017 0.0015 0.0034 0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0018)* (0.0018)
# of assignees 0.0150 -0.0261 0.0145 -0.0348
(0.0116) (0.0094)*** (0.0169) (0.0143)**
# of total prior patents -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
# of total subseq patents -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Innovation stage -0.0216 -0.0112 -0.0147 -0.0234
(0.0136) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0308)
Lag to total prior patents -0.0008 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0025)
Lag of total subseq patents 0.0008 0.0016 0.0015 0.0032
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0020)
# of primary classes in  -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0027 0.0019
   total prior patents (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0024)
# of primary classes in  0.0002 -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0013
   total subseq patents (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Observations 15198 14325 10882 10279  
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered by examiner in Panel A and by examiner x technology x year in Panel B, in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Panel A involves an US examiner fixed effect model. 
The dependent variable in Column 1is 1 if an applicant requests examination after seeing the EPO search report and 0 if 
he does not. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the lag of exam request, measured by the period between search 
report publication date and exam request date. The dependent variables in Columns 3-5 are EPO outcomes, conditional 
on a request for examination being made after the search report. Panel B involves a US examiner by technology by year 
fixed effect model.   
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Table 7: Testing the first alternative rationales of information flow   
 
 
EPO outcomes for observations with search report PRIOR to US patent issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) examiner fixed effect (b) examiner-tech-year fixed effect
Not Granted,  given Success  Not  Granted,  given Success 
withdrawn nowithdrawal at EPO withdrawn nowithdrawal at EPO
SMPP 0.1277 0.0506 0.1451 0.1556 0.0507 0.1772
(0.0372)*** (0.0261)* (0.0405)*** (0.0566)*** (0.0400) (0.0624)***
Have assistant examiner 0.0101 0.0187 0.0282 -0.0114 0.0400 0.0186
(0.0255) (0.0194) (0.0263) (0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0511)
# of LLPP (log) -0.0071 -0.0050 -0.0075 -0.0149 -0.0153 -0.0197
(0.0143) (0.0099) (0.0149) (0.0214) (0.0170) (0.0235)
# of claims 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0005)** (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010)
# of classifications 0.0023 0.0028 0.0035 0.0009 0.0031 0.0020
(0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0058)
# of inventors -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0034 -0.0020 0.0049
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0069)
# of assignees 0.0549 0.0456 0.0814 0.0824 0.0815 0.1171
(0.0377) (0.0306) (0.0430)* (0.0603) (0.0502) (0.0698)*
# of total prior patents -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)* (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
# of total subseq patents 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001)* (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Innovation stage -0.0597 -0.0236 -0.0795 -0.1223 -0.0093 -0.1429
(0.0497) (0.0339) (0.0535) (0.0638)* (0.0514) (0.0721)**
Lag to total prior patents -0.0040 0.0002 -0.0033 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0051)
Lag of total subseq patents -0.0027 0.0026 0.0007 0.0000 0.0027 0.0034
(0.0051) (0.0036) (0.0054) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0083)
# of primary classes in  -0.0024 0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0035 0.0013 -0.0029
   total prior patents (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0047) (0.0067)
# of primary classes in  0.0028 -0.0028 0.0015 0.0031 -0.0032 0.0012
   total subseq patents (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0053)
Observations 5153 3454 4917 3117 2075 2954  
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered by the fixed effects, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Columns 1-6 test the alternative rationale of information flow from the USPTO to the EPO, by 
studying observations whose EPO search reports were prior to the issuance of corresponding US patents. Columns 1-3 
involve an examiner fixed effect with dummies for technology fields and USPTO application years; Columns 4-6 
involve an examiner-technology-year fixed effect. The dependent variables are the same as in Tables 4 and 5. The 
dependant variables are in years.  55
Table 8: Testing the second alternative rationale of difficulty in finding prior art 
 
 
EPO Search Interval (years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) examiner fixed effect (b) examiner-tech-year fixed effect
Total search interval Search interval per Total search interval Search interval per
citation citation 
SMPP -0.0812 -0.0286 -0.0830 -0.0276
(0.0271)*** (0.0153)* (0.0369)** (0.0222)
Have assistant examiner 0.0035 0.0006 0.0002 0.0053
(0.0225) (0.0134) (0.0320) (0.0195)
# of LLPP (log) 0.0260 -0.0165 0.0293 -0.0063
(0.0125)** (0.0059)*** (0.0155)* (0.0078)
# of claims 0.0016 0.0004 0.0033 0.0006
(0.0006)*** (0.0003) (0.0008)*** (0.0004)
# of classifications 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0041 -0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0019)
# of inventors 0.0085 0.0006 0.0123 0.0022
(0.0048)* (0.0027) (0.0063)* (0.0038)
# of assignees -0.0445 0.0062 -0.0669 -0.0102
(0.0307) (0.0150) (0.0431) (0.0198)
# of total prior patents -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0004)
# of total subseq patents 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Innovation stage -0.0317 -0.0466 -0.0687 -0.0555
(0.0404) (0.0207)** (0.0507) (0.0269)**
Lag to total prior patents -0.0079 -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0067
(0.0029)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0037)* (0.0018)***
Lag of total subseq patents -0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0055 -0.0029
(0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0059) (0.0027)
# of primary classes in  -0.0055 -0.0060 -0.0031 -0.0086
   total prior patents (0.0043) (0.0019)*** (0.0052) (0.0027)***
# of primary classes in  0.0068 0.0024 0.0001 0.0010
   total subseq patents (0.0036)* (0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0023)
Observations 17422 16725 12495 11948  
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered by the fixed effects, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Columns 1-4 test the alternative rationale of difficulty of finding prior art, by studying the total search 
interval and the search interval per citation at the EPO search office. Columns 1-2 involve an examiner fixed effect with 
dummies for technology fields and USPTO application years; Columns 3-4 involve an examiner-technology-year fixed 
effect. The dependant variables are in years.  56
Table 9: Testing the third alternative: 
Effects of cited prior patents and missed prior patents on EPO application outcomes   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A:  Panel B:  Panel C: 
Not withdrawn at EPO Granted, given non-withdrawal Success at EPO
(a) Examiner fixed effect
# of cited prior patents -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0030
(0.0008)** (0.0008)*** (0.0007) (0.0007)** (0.0009)*** (0.0009)***
# of missed prior patents 0.0011 0.0015 0.0009 0.0012 0.0018 0.0024
(0.0005)** (0.0005)*** (0.0004)** (0.0004)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0006)***
control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 17525 17525 17525 11664 11664 11664 16568 16568 16568
(b) Examiner by technology by year fixed effect
# of cited prior patents -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0034
(0.0010)* (0.0010)** (0.0011) (0.0011)* (0.0012)** (0.0012)***
# of missed prior patents 0.0010 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 0.0016 0.0022
(0.0007) (0.0008)* (0.0006) (0.0007)* (0.0008)** (0.0009)**
control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12581 12581 12581 8308 8308 8308 11836 11836 11836  
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered by the fixed effects, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Test the effects of the number of cited prior art and the number of 
missed prior patents on EPO application outcomes. Part (a) involves a US examiner fixed effect model and Part (b) a US examiner by technology by year fixed effect. The dependent variables in 
Columns 1-3 are 1 if not withdrawn at the EPO and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in Columns 4-6 are 1 if granted and 0 if rejected, conditional on non-withdrawal. The dependent variables in 
Columns 7-9 are 1 if success (granted) at the EPO and 0 if failed (withdrawn or rejected). Control variables are the same controls in Table 4 and 5, with the number of total prior patents excluded. 
Dummies for each of the 30 technology fields and for each of the 6 USPTO application years are included in Part (a) that involve a US examiner fixed effect.   57
Table 10: EPO application outcomes, using a US examiner by patent assignee fixed effect model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Not Withdrawn Panel B: Granted,  Panel C: Success at EPO
(given nonwithdrawal)
SMPP 0.0698 0.0638 0.0517 0.0633 0.0563 0.0480 0.1095 0.0994 0.0766
(0.0287)** (0.0295)** (0.0310)* (0.0200)*** (0.0211)*** (0.0225)** (0.0315)*** (0.0327)*** (0.0344)**
Have assistant examiner 0.0026 0.0037 0.0040 0.0132 0.0147 0.0144 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0007
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0204) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0245)
# of LLPP (log) 0.0030 0.0085 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0025 -0.0075 0.0038 0.0087 -0.0011
(0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0074) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0115) (0.0121)
# of claims 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0005)** (0.0005)** (0.0005)** (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
# of classifications 0.0020 0.0013 0.0018 0.0022 0.0019 0.0020 0.0036 0.0027 0.0029
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
# of inventors 0.0032 0.0029 0.0022 0.0009 0.0007 0.0003 0.0048 0.0044 0.0038
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044)
# of assignees -0.1014 -0.1031 -0.1189 -0.0046 -0.0028 -0.0113 -0.0931 -0.0948 -0.1149
(0.0997) (0.0997) (0.0959) (0.0339) (0.0343) (0.0407) (0.1030) (0.1028) (0.0984)
# of total prior patents -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0005
(0.0005)*** (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)*** (0.0006)
# of total subseq patents 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0002)** (0.0002) (0.0001)** (0.0001)* (0.0002)*** (0.0002)
Innovation stage -0.0629 0.0320 -0.0417
(0.0392) (0.0324) (0.0467)
Lag to total prior patents 0.0001 0.0013 0.0017
(0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0029)
Lag of total subseq patents 0.0067 0.0007 0.0065
(0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0047)
# of primary classes in  -0.0013 -0.0044 -0.0069
   total prior patents (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0040)*
# of primary classes in  0.0011 0.0015 0.0029
   total subseq patents (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0034)
Observations 8152 8152 7830 5368 5368 5169 7649 7649 7343  
 
Note: Standard errors clustered by examiner x assignee in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Different specifications are tested, all of which involve a US 
examiner by patent assignee fixed effect. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application is not withdrawn and 0 if withdrawn by the applicant. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable 
is 1 if an EPO application is granted and 0 if rejected, conditional on it is not withdrawn. In column 7-9, the dependent variable is 1 if an EPO application succeeds (granted) at the EPO and 0 if failed 
(either withdrawn or rejected). Dummies for each of the 30 technology fields and for each of the 6 USPTO application years are included.   58
Table 11: Do primary examiner by secondary examiner fixed effects make difference? 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Primary and Secondary   Panel B: Primary and Secondary Examiners
Examiners fixed effects by Technology by Year fixed effects
Not withdrawn Granted, given Success  Not withdrawn Granted, given Success 
at EPO non-withdrawal at EPO at EPO non-withdrawal at EPO
(a) For patents either with a primary examiner or with both a primary and a secondary examiner
SMPP 0.0710 0.0214 0.0802 0.0613 0.0394 0.0747
(0.0210)*** (0.0173) (0.0237)*** (0.0304)** (0.0271) (0.0344)***
Observations 14044 9465 13302 9584 6404 9023
(b) For patents with both a primary examiner and a secondary examiner
SMPP 0.0875 0.0478 0.1141 0.1047 0.0359 0.1082
(0.0366)** (0.0297) (0.0414)** (0.0529)** (0.0452) (0.0604)*
Observations 5133 3427 4864 3486 2295 3288
Examiner fixed effect yes yes yes no no no
Tech and Year dummies yes yes yes no no no
Examiner-tech-year fixed effect no no no yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered by the fixed effects, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Part (a) includes patents that either have a primary examiner alone 
or have both primary and secondary examiners, and part (b) looks at patents with both primary and secondary examiners. Panel A in Columns 1-3 involve a US examiner fixed effect, with dummies for 
technology fields and USPTO application years. Panel B in Columns 4-6 involve a US examiner by technology by year fixed effect. 
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Table 12: JPO application outcomes 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Examiner fixed effect Panel B: Examiner-tech-year fixed effect 
Not withdrawn Granted, given Success Not withdrawn Granted, given Success
at JPO nonwithdrawal at JPO at JPO nonwithdrawal at JPO
SMPP 0.0472 0.0141 0.0455 0.0515 0.0240 0.0518
(0.0189)** (0.0235) (0.0218)** (0.0243)** (0.0345) (0.0282)*
Have assistant examiner -0.0074 0.0177 0.0112 0.0084 0.0423 0.0350
(0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0141) (0.0205) (0.0272) (0.0228)
# of LLPP (log) 0.0048 -0.0082 0.0005 0.0079 -0.0129 -0.0065
(0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0135) (0.0111)
# of claims -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0007
(0.0003)** (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
# of classifications -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0035
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0029)
# of inventors 0.0146 0.0154 0.0241 0.0158 0.0131 0.0243
(0.0027)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0039)***
# of assignees 0.0348 -0.0299 0.0123 0.0360 -0.0757 -0.0174
(0.0218) (0.0330) (0.0275) (0.0305) (0.0409)* (0.0368)
# of total prior patents 0.0001 0.0010 0.0005 0.0002 0.0015 0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0006)* (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)* (0.0007)*
# of total subseq patents 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Innovation stage -0.0796 -0.0924 -0.1060 -0.1145 -0.0763 -0.1254
(0.0251)*** (0.0334)*** (0.0294)*** (0.0317)*** (0.0501) (0.0389)***
Lag to total prior patents -0.0034 0.0037 -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0019 0.0009
(0.0016)** (0.0022)* (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0025)
Lag of total subseq patents 0.0038 0.0090 0.0083 0.0046 0.0042 0.0058
(0.0028) (0.0042)** (0.0033)** (0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0043)
# of primary classes in  -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0022 -0.0012
   total prior patents (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0039)
# of primary classes in  0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0008 0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0003
   total subseq patents (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0027)
Observations 17574 10208 15450 12625 7491 11155  
 
Note: Standard errors clustered by the fixed effects in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Panel A in Columns 1-3 involve a US examiner fixed effect, with 
dummies for technology fields and USPTO application years. Panel B in Columns 4-6 involve a US examiner by technology by year fixed effect. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 4 are is 1 if a 
JPO application is not withdrawn and 0 if withdrawn by the applicant. The dependent variables in Columns 2 and 5 are 1 if a JPO application is granted and 0 if rejected, conditional on it is not 
withdrawn. The dependent variables in Columns 3 and 6 are 1 if a JPO application succeeds (granted) at the JPO and 0 if failed (either withdrawn or rejected).  60
 
Appendix A: M-CAM NLP Algorithm 
 
 
For a given root patent, M-CAM algorithm provides five sets of patents: (1) patents that are cited 
by the root patents (cited prior patents); (2) patents that cite the root patents (citing subsequent patents); 
(3) patents that are linguistically (and technically) related, but were not cited (uncited prior patents); (4) 
patents that are linguistically (and technically) related, issued later, and did not cite the root patent 
(unciting subsequent patents); and (5) patents that are linguistically related, and being prosecuted by the 
USPTO at the same time as the root patent (concurrent art). 
For clarity, we refer to an example below.  Figure 1 illustrates the sets of patents that M-CAM’s 
algorithm detects for a US patent (US5319702). Across the bottom of the figure, is a time line from 
1973 to 2005. The height of the “mountains” represents the relative number of patents issued in the 
year in a particular category. In the M-CAM interface, the “mountains” are colour coded. Here, for lack 
of color, they are different shades of grey.   
The dark grey mountain in the middle represents “concurrent art.” US5319702 was going through 
the patent office during the years 1992 to 1996 and the dark grey mountain represents patents that are 
linguistically related to US ‘702 according to the algorithm and for which the applications were 
proceeding through the patent office at the same time as the ‘702 patent.  It is likely that examiners 
may therefore have missed this body of art, regardless of its relevance to the root patent.     
The low, black “mountains” indicated cited and citing patents. The black area to the left of the 
concurrent art area indicates patents that are cited by the root patent (cited prior patents), and the black 
area to the right of the concurrent art area indicates patents that cite the ‘702 patent (citing subsequent 
patents). The light grey mountains to the left and right side of the concurrent art area indicate, 
respectively: patents that the algorithm finds linguistically related but are not cited by the root patent 
(uncited prior patents), and patents that the algorithm finds linguistically related but that do not cite the 
root patent (unciting subsequent patents). 
The linguistically linked previous patents (LLPP), used in the study, are the light grey mountain to 
the left of the concurrent art area. Among these, M-CAM algorithm also highlights those whose 
similarity to the root patent is very significant. Those highlighted LLPP are used as M-CAM missed 
prior patents to construct the variable, share of missed prior patents (SMPP). Of course, the algorithm 
is not comparable to a legal or technical assessment of whether a previous patent “should have been   61
cited.” However, on average, and over a large data set, the algorithm does provide a useful tool for 
understanding technically related patents. 
 
 
Figure A1: M-CAM Innovation Space 
 
 